The Personalist

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WHY A SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY?

BY THE EDITOR[1]

On Cape Cod in Massachusetts there lived a philosopher of the neighborhood type who was continually heckled by the boys at the village store because of his cosmic views. He was credited with being crazy not so much because his views were different as because they were cosmic. It was not considered decent for one of his humble position to think. He was considered crazy because he differed from the rest of the neighborhood by thinking. This is likely to be the reputation of the thinker. In recounting this to a friend he reminded me of a similar example. In this case the man cited as crazy acquired his reputation for favoring a proton-electron theory of the origin of the universe under the older term of electricity.

To the men of Oxford the contention of Roger Bacon that machinery could sometime be applied to the navigation of ships and of wagons, and that men would some day fly through the air, was so absurd that they nicknamed the bridge in the little tower of which he conducted his experiments, "Folly Bridge," a name that still survives.

Times have not much changed for the man of the street, in his profession of contempt for everything he does not easily understand. That is why philosophy must always begin by offering an *apologia*. Nevertheless philosophy of some kind is always with us, surviving whatever contempt is heaped upon it, living in whatever ideas are held by its contemners. Let us consider this strange phenomenon.

Sight and Insight

When we come to examine the matter I think we shall find there is no interest in facts simply as facts. If there were, we should be satisfied to read the mortuary tables instead of

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biographies, and the history of civilization could be satisfactorily summed up in the statistics from a sociological questionnaire. Instead of a love affair with its attendant sentiment, sighs and thrills, we should mind the Behaviorists and be content with "chemisms" in the brain. These could eventually be produced in the test tube, saving much worry, time and expense.

However, we are not satisfied with these, at least no one but the Behaviorists have seemed to be, though they come weighted with the claims of scientific exactitude. We have discovered that none of these things become interesting until they are clothed in the decent garments of philosophic interpretation. We long always for the human interests. We attempt to cloak our facts with the gossamer of purpose, dream, sentiment, value, tragedy or happiness. Knowledge becomes of interest as we weave into it the analogies of our own experience of life, our sense of the unseen and invisible forces. Without philosophy, history is the uninteresting recital of chronology without interpretation; biology the bare rehearsal of humdrum facts; psychology the repetition of meaningless reactions; physics the detail of inexplicable and unrelated motions. Without philosophy with its values, its purposes, its meanings, our whole world becomes a dehumanized, a dead and worthless thing.

We need to travel only thus far to discover that in a world wherein we have been tempted to consider sight the whole thing, by far the most important thing is *insight*. It has been the peculiar temptation of a scientific age, to consider sight more important than insight. We are like the illiterate who supposed that spectacles would enable him to read without the trouble of learning the alphabet. Lenses, however scientifically adjusted, can be of no assistance to blind eyes.

Without insight scientific discovery cannot insure progress in the social order; in fact its discoveries become a menace to the social order, since all social advances come only through coordination of the individual to the general good. There

must then be dreamers, philosophers with far sight to point out what is the general good not for the time, the occasion, or the individual only, but for the long run of human destiny and the highest goal of the races. It was Plato who defined the true philosopher as "the spectator of all time and all existence"; and there has never been a better definition.

In the matter of insight, too, philosophy has a task to perform for religion. Without it religion becomes an unexpressed, inarticulated "experience," cut off from the world of scientific fact and any basis in reason. While religion must remain fundamentally in the region of faith and the mystical experience, it cannot long survive for thinking men if it presents that which is in violent disagreement with science and logic. Here philosophy offers the important role of mediation and interpretation. With its emphasis upon insight as the fulfiller of sight it calls attention to those invisible foci of life that determine the orbit of the visible and sensible world of action, declaring our highest faith is not in vain, but a reasonable part of the Cosmic Order.

But Why a School?

So far we have been engaged in an *apologia* for philosophy. We must in the few remaining moments attempt to justify a school; yet our *apologia* must be seen as an essential portion of our answer to the question, "Why a School of Philosophy?" The answer must depend upon the importance to our civilization of developing the insight of which we have spoken.

Here I can perhaps do no better than to summon the testimony of a man who is remarkable for insight, but cannot be accused of being a professional philosopher. It was Henry Seidel Canby who recently wrote:[2]

> There is a vast body of critical literature discussing every one of the great problems of esthetics, religion, and ultimate truth; but little of it that is modern is confident or convincing. When Roger Bacon recorded his experiments in cipher, when the Arabs made their first brilliant researches in the human body, when Democritus and his

[2]The Saturday Review of Literature, May 4, 1929.

fellow Greeks first speculated upon the physical nature of the universe, their discoveries had short shrift or brief development, even when known at all, because men fundamentally believed in different realities. It was not until the earth was felt worthy of analysis that science began its great course. And it is because there has been a canker of skepticism at the root of every modern attempt to establish a reality for the moral, the esthetic, and the spiritual worlds, that the best minds in our culture have either given themselves to science, or worked indecisively, leaving speculation upon a reality which was after all only speculative to religious cranks, ignorant and fanatical, or obsessed upholders of an authority from the past which for us had little meaning. Thanks to the sciences of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and the science of history, we can understand Moses, Plato, Mohammed, Calvin better than ever before. Thanks to the new and seeming demonstration that the realities attributed to them by science were only a part of their reality, we are free to go on to a better understanding, and, if the age favors us, have new Platos (one hesitates before new Calvins and Mohammeds) who will use science as corrective and eliminant whence wisdom may begin. This is a job for young men. And if I were directing a university from which creative intellects were expected to emerge I should insist first of all, and with an emphasis not to be escaped, that every student with speculation in his soul and creation in his power should get that scientific training which our race of critical intellects today conspicuously lacks. And I should insist that he should be grounded for further flights (as our scientists are not) upon all that can be learned from the past, not only of literature, but also of ethics, philosophy, and (as a tool) of metaphysics. For no writer upon criticism who cannot keep pace with and interpret the results of modern scientific thinking should be listened to in the next decade. Nor should any scientist ignorant of the vast methodology of speculative thinking built up by men who believed in a reality not dependent upon atoms and formulas, dare to adventure upon the mountain path which our thinking must soon begin to follow. If the philosopher without science is an ignoramus, the scientist without philosophy is likely to prove a

babe who believes that the world is the arms that support him.

Why then a school? First of all to place the emphasis where emphasis is important, in a moment in history when such emphasis is timely, for we stand at a point in world experience which has never been exceeded in sight. Modern science and invention have put in our hands vast new powers. Unless our sight shall be attended and equalled by our insight we face the destruction of civilization.

Our modern culture based upon an individualistic and personalistic philosophy faces an Oriental civilization in many respects antagonistic and impersonal. Should Oriental civilization take over only the scientific, material, and mechanistic elements of our civilization, our world is doomed. We aim to plant here a school with such complete facilities for research, with such notable gathering of world philosophers, as to form a rallying center for both East and West of those deeper insights by which men really live.

We mean without prejudice or favor to investigate the wisdom of all times, ages and races, and to approach the world's thinking with an open mind, harboring no hallucination that the mind of man has yet arrived at adequate solutions. We aim to listen patiently and with discernment to all voices, and to beware only of those that belittle the human spirit and decry the reality of its highest values. We mean to emphasize the mental and spiritual values as the realities of greatest importance for man. We emphasize the graduate character of our work by organizing as a school that we may become helpful as teachers of teachers of men. To this task we dedicate our supreme powers.

IN A CLASS-ROOM: TWO SONNETS

BY LESLYN MAC DONALD

"Found in a Notebook"

I think God lives in very far blue skies,
And dreaming trees, and mold of leaves blown down,
In noise and jostle of the bright-roofed town,
And little children's alien surprise.
Sometimes I pierce his cleverest disguise;
He is the smile behind the pensive frown,
He is the color in the maple's gown,
He is a Person very gay and wise.

But in the clanging joust of word and word
I think he takes no part, but hides his head,
Annoyed as by a gnat's dim buzzing sound.
And when the final edict has been heard,
And when the last philosopher is dead,
He'll lift His brow, and calmly look around.

"The Love Sonnet of a Philosopher on Reading Ouspensky's Tertium Organum"

They say that Chanticleer thinks that he sings
A new sun up each day, and that he sees
Across the yard a newer row of trees
Where yesterday he crowed and tried his wing.
They say that so we see the mornings pass,
One after one, while Morning stays the same;
That it is we who change and not the flame
Of spring, that sleeps eternal in the grass.

If that is so, beloved, then this year
Is not another year, but still the one
Wherein we loved; and could I only turn
My moving self, I might, like Chanticleer
Finding you constant, as he would the sun
See Time's illusion, and so cease to yearn.

JAMES WARD AS A PERSONAL IDEALIST

BY JOHN S. MARSHALL

Since Ward's death in March of 1925, a number of reviews have appeared of both his psychological and his philosophical work. These reviews have stressed many phases of his work, but none of them have specifically treated his theory of personality and the important place it held in his philosophy. It does not seem improbable that the movement which came to be called Personal Idealism drew much of its inspiration from the writing and teaching of James Ward, although of course it was inspired also by Lotze and William James. It must be remembered that it was Ward's article, *Psychology,* in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* which destroyed the dominant British associational psychology. Ward founded a new British psychology which posited the self as the active experient which is necessary to explain the nature of the mental life. Professor Stout was trained by Ward in this new psychology. It was Stout's psychology that became the corner-stone of the thought of Personal Idealism.

Ward is not only historically connected with Personal Idealism—a movement which he never formally joined, possibly because it was an Oxford School—but his thought developed upon lines somewhat similar in nature. He was less pragmatic than most of the Personal Idealists and his stress upon personality was not as insistent as theirs. This will be clear if we sketch the outlines of his philosophy in the light of his interpretation (1) of the nature of the person, (2) of its place in knowledge, and (3) in the structure of the world.

I

The Person and Personality

For Ward individual experience is a duality in unity. It is the subject-object relation. Experience involves the self and its objects. These the self is aware of, and upon them it acts. These objects are not created by the self under the compulsion of a stimulus. Neither are they modifications of consciousness. Here Ward obviously disagrees with the general tendency in

Personal Idealism. He terms himself a "Natural Realist" and names Reid as his predecessor at this point. The attending self is aware of and acts upon the sensory continuity presented to it. This extensive continuum of sensations, as Ward terms it, is not a part of the self or the self's activities. It is rather a part of the world not of the self, with which the self is in functional relation. However, perception is phenomenal in relation to the world beyond, because the sensory continuum takes on a representative function; it reveals the world beyond itself. This theory obviously has a resemblance to Leibniz's doctrine of each monad's mirroring the entire world. It stands in contrast to the pragmatic theory of perception held by Dr. Schiller, for awareness is not entirely pragmatic with Ward except in the amount of discrimination and of synthesis. The continuum has a nature of its own apart from any acts of the self.

With this realistic conception of perception is joined a genetic theory of the origin of memory and thought. By means of selection the self creates a new continuum which contains elements previously present in perception. This is the memory thread. The manipulation of this reproduced material is imagining and thinking. The self first becomes aware of itself at this level. Self-consciousness is not immediate; it is rather a thought construction. The self or person is not directly aware of itself. It discovers its own image or meaning within its own creations. The products of its own thought reveal the person to itself. Now it is at the level of self-consciousness that we first have the appearance of personality. Personality is character at the level where the self recognizes itself in relation to other self-determining persons. It is a point of interest that Ward apparently uses the term 'person' only for those selves that have reached this level.

Although personality is the result of the activity of the self it is distinct from the self or person. Personality would not appear apart from personal activity, but it is conceivable, according to Ward, that the person might exist devoid of personality, or even having several personalities. Because of this

possible separation of the person and its personality Ward can consider the possibility of the doctrine of transmigration. At death the self might conceivably lose its personality. The person is immortal, but the personality conceivably might not be.

Ward's radical distinction between person and personality separates him from the general tenor of Personal Idealism. However, his theory differs from theirs more in the development of the theory of mental relations than in its general stress. He stresses as much as they the necessity of recognizing the person.

II

The Person and Knowledge

For Ward there are two poles of knowledge: sense-knowledge and thought-knowledge. The self manipulates the sensory continuum by means of motor activity. In this way it discriminates the continuum into sensations. Likewise, it integrates or synthesizes the sensations into percepts. An awareness of sensations is for Ward an awareness of mere matters of fact. Perception, however, because it is synthetic and hence creative, contains a personal element. It reflects in a vague sense the self because it is a result of the self's activity. The perceptual object is a thing because the substantial self created it by synthesis. Ward's theory of perception as personal is in entire agreement with the general theory of Personal Idealism; but his doctrine of sensations as mere matters of fact is realistic rather than personalistic. In his later writings he even used the realists' term for sensations; he called them 'sensa.'

Memory and thought are even more personal than perception. It is at this level that the categories or forms of thought become explicit. They are due to the activity of the self in synthesizing the material of memory and imagination; and accordingly are personal in origin and reveal to the self the nature of the world. Hence, the world is known as in some sense personal. However, if the categories are treated abstractly, as causality for example is in mechanics, their per-

sonal character is not clearly evident. It is for this reason that they are frequently treated as if they were impersonal in meaning and origin.

Thought-knowledge is the very opposite of sense-knowledge. It is a contemplation and manipulation of the categories apart from any content. The mathematical categories allow us to build up systems of abstract relations. The formal categories also allow a similar systematization of their implications. This is thought-knowledge. Between the extremes of sense-knowledge and thought-knowledge lies our usual thought activity. It is the interpretation of the meaning of the self and of the world, an interpretation of sense-perception and self-consciousness by means of the categories. This is clearly personal knowledge.

Ward considers that the interpretation of perception by means of the categories is knowledge; but the ideals of the personal life, although rational, are matters of faith not knowledge. Faith is the reasonable ideal of the striving person, rather than the realization of the ideal. We believe in God because our cognitive ideal is a completed world, a cosmos, and because our moral ideal is a world personally guided towards "the good."

III

The Supreme Person and the World of Selves

Ward rejects occasionalism in favor of his natural realism, which seems to him simpler and more in accord with the facts. According to the theory of the sensory continuum already explained, we are aware of a plasm of sensations distinct from the self perceiving it. This continuum is not consciousness but the object of consciousness. Ward considers the fact that perception and thought are personal *prima facie* evidence that the sensory plasm, as well as the rest of the world which perception vicariously presents, is personal. The law of continuity would also seem to lead us to the same conclusion. There seems to be no break between the organic and the inorganic. Accordingly, he thinks that the simplest and

best-founded hypothesis construes the world as entirely composed of interacting selves. On this assumption, if the brain were analyzed into its ultimate constituents, it would be found to be an interacting organism of rudimentary selves dominated by the person, or human self. The so-called material world is composed of very elemental selves, as in Leibniz's world scheme. This is Ward's pluralism. It is very similar to the pluralism of Personal Idealism. It seems to him so nearly empirical that it can hardly be termed an hypothesis. It is rather a direct interpretation of experience.

However, a strict pluralism does not satisfy either the cognitive or moral ideals. It provides for no significant unity in the world; and it furnishes no moral direction to the world order. Theism is not empirically verified, but it does gives an hypothesis which provides for that reasonable faith which personal life demands. It is both practically and theoretically justified. It furnishes a basis for both cognitive and moral organization within personal life. The belief in God and immortality gives purpose to the onward struggle of thought which seeks meaning in the whole of things, and moral endeavor whose aim is the good.

Clearly Ward's theory of faith as personal striving after cognitive and moral ideals is in harmony with the thought of Personal Idealism. It is rooted in the most creative aspects of Kant's value theories,—theories which have been the foundation of modern Personalism in general.

THE COHERENCE VIEW OF TRUTH

BY PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP

The very title of this article is likely to arouse some such ideas as the following in the mind of the reader: Why disturb the dry bones of the dead? Since Absolute Idealism (the exponent *par excellence* of the coherence view of truth) has been in its philosophical grave for some time, why not let it rest in peace? It is too dead to do anybody any harm.

In answer to which I reply: It is just because there is so much truth in these statements about the present position of Absolute Idealism and (as a corollary of this) of the coherence view of truth, that it seems to me important that we should remind ourselves of certain aspects of the theory. There are phases of it which appear to me to be of more than ordinary significance, aspects which, as I hope to show, are, in fact, of permanent value to philosophical thought. Moreover, I feel the need of calling attention to these significant elements of the theory all the more because I am perfectly sure that coherence as *the* only account of the nature of truth is once and for all *ein uberwundener Standpunkt*. So far am I from being an absolute idealist, however, that I hope to point out before the conclusion of this article that the coherence view as held by such men as Bradley and Bosanquet is finally self-refuting. At the same time it is rather pitiful that some of the distinct gains made by the theory should be lost sight of just because it is impossible to accept the theory as a whole. It is in this conviction, therefore, and in the hope of helping in some small way to save some really important fragments out of the general wreck of Absolute Idealism that I want to discuss in what follows certain elements in the coherence view of truth which, by being overlooked and under-estimated, are bound to make our own philosophical work today that much the poorer. These are elements, I believe, which we cannot afford to treat lightly if we would not be the losers.

Before definitely entering upon an enumeration and discussion of these elements of permanent value in the coherence

view of truth, it is, however, necessary briefly to call attention to the fact that this view of truth is, basically as well as in its outcome, very much more than a *mere* "theory of truth." It is an entire philosophic system. This fact is of such fundamental importance for any understanding of the theory that it must not be left out of sight at any point of the discussion of the theory. That is, the coherence view of truth is part and parcel of the whole system of Absolute Idealism and cannot really be separated from it. Therein may lie a certain strength, a strength which the system as a whole may have, and may therefore be able to give to its parts. Therein, on the other hand, may also lie a fundamental weakness. We shall see how far this is true.

There should be little doubt that among theories of epistemological monism the coherence view of truth (and of knowledge) is by far the most adequate. And this simply because it is (or at any rate *should be,* though for many or rather *all* new realists it does not seem to be at all) obvious that knowledge and truth are matters of *experience.* By insisting that *"Reality is Experience"* Absolute Idealism has recognized *experience* as the most valuable and significant (in its own system, in fact, as the *only* valuable and significant because the *only real*) aspect of the universe. This view, as is well known, is diametrically opposed to the other theory of epistemological monism, *i. e.,* that of New Realism, which maintains that the One is the world of physical reality, a view in which there is, obviously, no room for *experience* at all, and in which knowledge and truth, therefore, are simply some of the facts of the physical world alongside of other physical facts. In other words, the insistence of Absolute Idealism on the Reality of Experience emphasizes the mental fact rather than the physical one and thus acknowledges (to that extent) the reality of knowledge—a reality which is, after all, in the realm of mind rather than in that of matter. This emphasis on *Experience* as being the only ultimately Real is certainly of more than merely passing significance for an age

and in a country (such as the United States of America at the present time) where the achievements in the realm of the physical sciences have turned the heads not only of the business-engineer, efficiency-expert, and money-grabber but also of the psychologists and philosophers, to the extent that these men of mental attainment seem hardly able to see anything but their own (physical) nose (and other things of like physical constitution). It is an emphasis of really lasting and permanent value, moreover, because of the essential nature of man. Because of his essential nature man's highest achievements in the most truly human fields are possible only whenever he recognizes the reality and supreme value of *experience.*

I am by no means unmindful of the fact that this last sense of taking "experience" is not only far from identical with the *Absolute Experience* of absolute idealists but is positively contradictory to their meaning; for if there is any one thing which Experience does *not* mean for them it certainly is the finite experiences of finite men. Yet I do not think that this fact—of which I am fully aware—invalidates the particular application I have made above. For it is the idealist's emphasis upon Experience as over against the materialist's emphasis on *things* which I hold to be of permanent value and significance in every possible way. More particularly so as leaving room for the distinctly experiential and mental nature of knowledge and of truth.

In the second place, the coherence view of truth scores a point of lasting importance in its insistence on the *unity of experience,* and, as a consequence of this, on the unity of knowledge. Any unbiased student of the problem of knowledge can hardly get away from the fact that knowledge, after all, does seem to be a coherent system yielding to logical treatment and analysis. And it is an also well known fact that the most thorough-going and consistent advocates of this type of theory of knowledge are those who espouse the coherence view of truth. Knowledge does hang together; and the idealist must be

credited with not only emphasizing this fact but working it out into its minutest details and implications. This is indeed an achievement which is worth while and one which to overlook can hardly help but be disastrous to any serious epistemology. For "logical atomism" in epistemology would seem to be not far short of epistemological anarchy and chaos. The idealistic proof that knowledge is "of a piece," worked out by both Bradley and Bosanquet in their respective works on Logic, would seem to have made a really serious consideration of any piece-meal explanation of knowledge forever impossible.

This consideration leads quite naturally to a third emphasis contained in the coherence view of truth which deserves to be considered as of permanent value, and that is its doctrine of *internal relations*. This is, of course, part and parcel of the inherent logical consistency of the idealistic system. For if Reality is Experience, and if this Experience is a unity, then there obviously cannot be any doctrine of external relations, for all things must be fused in the One and Only Experience. However one may judge of the metaphysical aspects of this theory —and there are few living philosophers who would care to defend these whole-heartedly at the present time—the doctrine of internal relations would nevertheless seem to be of vital importance for any *organic* view of knowledge. And knowledge does seem to me to have an essentially organic character (which is implied in what I have said in the previous paragraph under the discussion of the unity of knowledge). The elements or bits which constitute the knowledge-experience cannot (logically and to the end) be conceived as beads just strung along one beside the other (which would be external relation); they seem to enter into each other vitally and determinatingly, one growing out of the other, and one implying the other, and one often necessitating or at least calling for or demanding the other. Thus the doctrine of the internal relatedness or of the fusion of things in knowledge is not only essential for an idealistic theory of knowledge, but vitally significant for any theory of knowledge which wants really *knowl-*

edge and not just separate bits of unrelated atoms. To what length such an atomism of separate and unrelated bits of (so-called) knowledge-contents will go, and to what ultimate skepticism and despair of all possibility of knowledge it is bound to lead, is historically best known through the attempts of Hume in that direction. This reminder should be enough for anyone acquainted with the history of philosophy to send him in search of something more fruitful than the doctrine of external relations, if the fact of knowledge—which is certainly undeniable in human experience—is to find any adequate explanation. Such search is rewarded by the doctrine of internal relatedness which is an essential part of the coherence view of truth.[1]

A fourth distinct emphasis of the coherence view of truth which is not only worthy of serious consideration but which seems to be destined to come more and more to the front (cf., for example, Bergson's and the German phenomenologists' use of it) is that which asserts that knowledge is not merely a system of propositions but also *felt intuition*. That knowledge, in other words, is not merely an addition of facts gathered one by one and then added up, but is directly and immediately "taken together" things seen as unified wholes in their completeness and entirety. It is the essence of knowledge, in a rather precarious sense of the phrase, to "be one with," to "enter into," to "live in" the object of knowledge (the logical step to the idealistic doctrine of the complete and final One-ness and actual identity of knower and known in the One Absolute Experience). Though here again we must keep in mind that if carried to the extreme to which the idealistic doctrine carries this view (namely that of numerical and every other kind of

[1]Perhaps it is necessary to add that I cannot, of course, go with the absolute idealist in his denial of all and any kind of external relation. To insist that the problem of knowledge does not admit of any rational solution without the espousal of the doctrine of internal relatedness does not, it seems to me, necessitate the denial of the fact of external relations in fields other than that of "knowledge" or of the "knowing act." In other words, to accept the epistemological value and application of the doctrine of internal relatedness does not, it seems to me, oblige one to accept the entire metaphysical system which goes with it in the case of the absolute idealist.

identity between subject and object) it makes knowledge itself impossible because simply nothing at all, it must yet be admitted that there would seem to be something in the knowledge-relation which can only be explained as a direct, immediate and intuitive grasp, a "feeling-in" with, a "living in," an experiencing of certain objects of knowledge (cf. æsthetic, moral, religious experiences and "knowledge" if, indeed, they can be called "knowledge"). For the purposes of this particular discussion the question as to what status shall or may be given (logically and in consistent explanation of the facts) to this type of "knowledge" may be left open, but it may at least be asserted that the absolute idealist is not talking nonsense by any means when he is describing this "felt intuition" as a real aspect of much of knowledge-experience. The further truth that this fact of common experience (*i. e.,* the "felt intuition") has thus far been almost studiously avoided by epistemologists of the various philosophical schools does not obviate the fact of its actual existence in every man's experience. It therefore needs to be taken into serious consideration, and we must be grateful to the idealist for calling it again to our attention and doing it in a fashion which necessitates our coming to some sort of terms with it.

Two other emphases, which some friends of Absolute Idealism might insist upon as being of permanent value in the coherence view of truth, I consider to be of a diametrically opposite character; that is to say, so far from considering them as of any positive value, I consider the first one of them as being actually destructive of the very essence of knowledge (and of truth), and the second one as of no significance whatever for the problem of knowledge or of truth. I refer (1) to the fact that the coherence theory is an *epistemological* MONISM, and (2) to the idealistic emphasis on the *One-ness of* BEING. Let us briefly look at each of these.

The epistemological monist (of whatever type) insists that if the knower is ever to really *know* the object of which he claims to have any knowledge there cannot be fixed between

the knower and the thing to be known any gulf which, as he thinks, is implied in any epistemological dualism or pluralism. Therefore, he insists, the only possible way ever to get real knowledge is to have numerical identity of knower and known, of subject and object. In reply to this it needs to be pointed out, however, that whatever this sort of thing (*i. e.,* the numerical identity of subject-object, or epistemological monism) may be, one thing it is *not:* namely, knowledge. Nor, in the very nature of the case, can it be an account of knowledge. For if knowledge be anything at all (at this point it does not matter *what*) it must be at least itself: *i. e.,* knowledge. And if it is anything it certainly is not nothing. In identifying subject and object, however, the epistemological monist has succeeded in making knowledge *nothing,* for there is now neither a subject which knows, nor an object which is to be known. In other words, by trying to make knowledge possible through the identification of subject and object (*i. e.,* by recourse to an epistemological monism) knowledge, so far from having become possible or explained, has in fact been annihilated. It seems to me, therefore, that no epistemological monism can ever, in the very nature of the case, account for, explain, or even leave any possible room for knowledge. The claim of the epistemological monist of the idealistic type, therefore, that by annihilating the (supposed) gap created by any epistemological dualism or pluralism he has made knowledge possible and explicable, and that his epistemological monism is therefore entitled to be counted among the permanent values and significant contributions of the coherence view of truth, is hereby summarily rejected, on the grounds given.

As concerns the other claim of the absolute idealist, namely the significance and value of his insistence on the *One-ness of* BEING, all that needs here to be said is this: of whatever value this concept may or may not be *metaphysically,* I cannot see that it has any significance whatsoever for *epistemology* or for *the theory of truth.* It is a metaphysical and *not* an epistemological problem. We need not, therefore, consider it here.

Finally, I am not so sure but that the point of greatest value and of most lasting importance of the coherence view of truth lies in the fact that in being true to itself and in carrying its position to its logical conclusion (which in this case could even more appropriately be called "the bitter end") it finally arrives at a skepticism so thorough-going that even Hume in his most skeptical moods cannot be claimed to have surpassed it. That is to say, in so far as the coherence view claims at all to be a theory of truth (or of knowledge) it comes to naught, it ends in utter self-refutation. And that necessarily so. For if "Reality is Experience" and there is neither a subject which knows nor an object to be known, when even the most comprehensive and coherent system of knowledge is after all only partial and therefore *not really* REAL, since only the Ultimate Reality, *i. e.,* Total Experience, is Real, and when Truth, therefore, can never be had because the very idea of some one having Truth is already a violation of Absolute Idealism's basic position by making any kind of distinctions within Reality—in the light of all these idealistic claims (almost any one of which could easily be exchanged for any other, since they all say finally the same thing, e. g. that "Reality is One Experience") there obviously cannot be room for either truth or knowledge (or, for that matter, for anything else). So that it really comes to this that the so-called "coherence *view of* TRUTH" is no view of truth or even of knowledge at all; in fact, it is an outright and emphatic denial of even the possibility of truth or knowledge, if these two words are taken in their ordinary sense. If in answer to this statement it be objected that we ought, then, to take these terms in the sense in which the idealist uses them, I reply: Truth for the idealist (in so far as he will admit it at all as anything Real) is simply another name for Reality, or for Ultimate Experience. In other words, since it is simply again The All or Totality it has lost every and all specific significance and cannot be considered, therefore, as a "theory of truth" at all. Nevertheless I consider it of real value that such a man as Bradley did not shrink back from

carrying his "coherent and comprehensive" position through to its *consistent* and logical conclusion—even though this conclusion did indeed lead to "the suicide of knowledge and of truth." If human experience is to remain significant and meaningful, the "coherence view of truth" (so-called) cannot be considered seriously in spite of the elements of permanent value which it contains, as I have tried to show above.

The suicidal conclusion of the coherence view should serve, as a matter of fact, as a warning-signal to epistemological monisms of whatever kind. For it is obvious that such a monism—no matter how ingenious (and Absolute Idealism certainly was that in the hands of such masters of philosophy as Bradley and Bosanquet)—always must break down in its attempt to account for knowledge (truth and error). Simply because any identification of knowledge (and truth) with reality (whether the identification be carried out in terms of "experience" and therefore in the direction of Idealism, or in terms of "matter-in-motion" and therefore in the direction of Materialism) leaves no longer any room for either knowledge or truth. If knowledge (or truth) *be* reality (whether spiritual or physical) then it simply IS reality and *not* something else, *i. e.*, knowledge (or truth). If knowing is not some sort of a relation between a subject which knows and an object which is being known, then it is simply not what knowledge always has meant. To identify knowledge with reality in any kind of epistemological monism finally leads to the realization that there is no knowledge to be explained—because knowledge is really non-existent.

In view of these facts it is no wonder that—as we have frankly admitted in the beginning of this article—Absolute Idealism as such is no longer a live philosophical issue. But I repeat that this fact should not be allowed to blind us to the real contributions which the coherence view of truth has made to philosophical knowledge and understanding. The four special doctrines enumerated above (*i. e.*, (1) reality as experience, (2) the unity of experience, (3) the doctrine of

the internal relatedness of knowledge, and (4) "felt intuition") are of sufficient importance to justify the statement that their value is permanent, as well as the warning to any new system-builders in philosophy that they had better not pass over them lightly. They contain a real insight which needs to be preserved.

THE DEATHLESS FLAME

BY DR. VIRGINIA SPATES

When memory leads me down the path of youth
I am amazed at what was cast away
As little worth. I grasped at fair untruth
And lost the priceless pearl. The skies of May
Were softer then—I did not know that I
Should never see their like again. And June—
Ah, June . . .! No jeweled night of stars swung high
In winter's chilly hand out-dazzles noon.
O what a careless thing is youth! And yet—
How sweet. It throws its glamor on our path
Long after it is fled. Should we forget
Its tears and smiles—life's aftermath—
How void of brightness later days would seem,
For when age comes, of vanished youth we—dream.

THE MAN AGAINST THE SKY—EDWIN ARLINGTON ROBINSON

BY JOSEPHINE HAMMOND

It is not only to rehearse some of the praise that is placing Mr. Robinson as the most distinctive figure in American poetry today, and not only to counter something of the charge made often against him of dryness, of narrowness of range, and of excessive melancholy, that I write him across my page in his own phrase—*The Man Against the Sky*. I suggest that his gold-and-iron tone rolling down from his hilltop carries a powerful challenge to our American ethos.

The face and figure of America have been richly celebrated in our recent poetic renascence: Robinson, more potently than any other of our singers, is reminding her that she has a spiritual significance to fight for.

Save in *Dionysus in Doubt* and *Demos and Dionysus*—two such indifferently written pieces we may be glad their kind is not multiple in the poet's work—Robinson has not occupied himself with polemic. Too intelligent to rest in the Hebraic-Puritan doctrine—*Man is naturally depraved;* too keen a realist to accept the lingering fallacy of The Enlightenment—*All men are naturally good*—he stands on the middle ground of studied humanism; as artist, he is content to imply that spiritual significance comes strangely to the worst and best of men.

His work falls in line with our best critical tradition. Like Emerson, Thoreau, Whitman, he finds no wisdom in our common demagogic and theocratic platitudes: he sees no worth in the rule of the many, if the many are without honor and disciplined appetite. So far as his firmly formed body of dramatic narrative, portraiture, and meditation reveal an integrated philosophy, it seems to suggest that though Man is but an incident in the play of inscrutable forces the individuality of his thought and feeling is infinitely valuable.

Today the world is arming against the freedom of individualistic growth. In Russia, in Italy, in America, vast projects are afoot to coerce and gag the free developments of

peoples. Though bound to cosmic destinies, these peoples might, if not belabored to a form, achieve creative dignity. Robinson speaks for those who know that variation in Society is imperative to its well-being. He speaks for those who dread to see the gusto and the peculiarity of life subdued to Robotic uniformity.

In the didactic *Dionysus* he speaks in doggerel, but he speaks prophetically. His *Dionysus* is not the folk-figure, the wine-bibber, of Bacchic comedy. He is that great god whose cupped being holds the aspirations and ecstasies of men. He is the god of Creation—the Life-Giver—the Poet—the Maker. His delicate irony cannot pierce the hide of *Demos:*

> You measure me
> By something in a flagon or a glass—
> And we're away from that. Leaving aside
> The lesser and the larger mysteries,
> By what obscured immeasurable means
> Are you to have in your attractive prison
> The music of the world and of the stars
> Without me, or to make of love and art
> The better part—without me?

Demos—and Robinson's Demos is but the soulless part of the nobler *Demos*—will learn nothing of the older god.

> I fear, my master, you are left behind.
> One of these days the world will be a hive—
> The veritable asylum you deplore
> So vainly now. Then every little bee
> Will have his little task, and having done it,
> His time to play. So all will be in order,
> And the souring hopes of individuals
> To be some days themselves, though God knows how,
> Will all be sweetened with synthetic honey.
> The waste of excellence that you call art
> Will be a thing remembered as a toy
> Dug somewhere from forgotten history:
> And this infirmity that you call love
> Will be subdued to studious procreation.
> . . . . . .
> We have had too much of the insurgent individual
> With his free fancy and free this and that,
> And his ingenuous right to be himself.

These lines are only penny-bright beside the usual golden sheen of Robinson's work, but the thought in them is linked to the issues of the more magnificent singing—that singing so full of *the music of the world and of the stars*—that singing that carries always the insistence that men have souls to exercise. It is singing which celebrates beyond all else that integration of human stuff which we call character.

It is claimed that Robinson's verse is too tinged with bitterness, too charged with depressive currents of men's futilities, to be a bracing challenge to our time. Growing appreciation of the poet is revealing him, however, as a philosopher steeped in the dye that the greater poets have worn gladly. His colors are sombre, but they only half conceal the ardent Light they cover. This Light Robinson is always finding at the core of things. He will have it that only the sensitized intellect can catch a glimmer of that Light—*that orient Word* that, somewhere, lives on in the dark. He is like his *Lancelot,* and a Voice within him says:

> You are not free.
> You have come to the world's end, and it is best
> You are not free. Where the Light falls, death falls;
> And in the Darkness comes the Light.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> But always in the Darkness he rode on,
> Alone; and in the darkness came the Light.

It is the *Light in Darkness* which is the burden of his song. Through all the strangely crossed currents of human living, through ambitions and futilities and passions and dreams—tides of living not differing now from when they surged through *Tristram* and *Isolt,* tides of living that will be the same hundreds of years from now when *Isaac* and *Archibald* and *Richard Cory* are ancientries—through all the dark of the stream some light plays. Sometimes it seems most light where dark is darkest. The Light is the Truth man knows when he feels most surely. Whether this Truth be found in fulfillment or defeat it is the Light. Whether the Light be full-orbed, decrescent, or merely implied because black is black, the Light is the Truth.

We have some vision of this Light whenever Robinson perfectly projects the mood he works upon. It comes in the play of large and wise humor in Captain Craig:

> You have made
> The cement of your churches out of tears
> And ashes, and the fabric will not stand;
> The shifted walls that you have coaxed and shored
> So long with unavailing compromise
> Will crumble down to dust and blow away,
> And younger dust will follow after them;
> Though not the faintest and the farthest whirled
> First atom of the least that ever flew
> Shall be by man defrauded of the touch
> God thrilled with to make a dream for man
> When Science was unborn. And after time,
> When we have earned our spiritual ears,
> And art's commiseration of the truth
> No longer glorifies the singing beast,
> Or venerates the clinquant charlatan,—
> Then shall at last come ringing through the sun,
> Through time, through flesh, a music that is true.

It comes in the moment of beauty when Merlin sups with Vivian at Broceliande:

> . . . He scanned again
> The immemorial meaning of her face
> And drew it nearer to his eyes. It seemed
> A flower of wonder with a crimson stem
> Came leaning slowly and regretfully
> To meet his will—a flower of change and peril
> That had a clinging blossom of warm olive
> Half stifled with a tyranny of black,
> And held the wayward fragrance of a rose
> Made woman by delirious alchemy.

And just as clearly it comes in the moment of Merlin's illumination when Vivian's lips are

> cold as leaves and have no answer;
> For Time had given him then, to prove his words,
> A frozen moment of a woman's life.

In piece after piece Robinson works like his own Rembrandt, painting the Dark that the Light may have the greater glory.

A man stands now and then against the sky—the sky of sunset flame—and there his black focal figure makes more light the great glare behind him:

> Dark, marvellous, and inscrutable he moved on
> Till down the fiery distance he was gone,
> Like one of those eternal, remote things
> That range across a man's imaginings
> When a sure music fills him and he knows
> What he may say hereafter to few men,—
> The touch of ages having wrought
> An echo and a glimpse of what he thought
> A phantom or a legend until then.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Where was he going, this man against the sky?
> You know not, nor do I.
> But this we know, if we know anything:
> That we may laugh and fight and sing
> And of our transcience here make offering
> To an orient Word that will not be erased,
> Or, save in incommunicable gleams
> Too permanent for dreams,
> Be found or known.

Like the figure of his song Robinson moves across our time. We honor ourselves when we attest him richly, remembering that he has asked no favor of his time or countrymen, himself a burning glass catching the light of incommunicable gleams. We shall find most light where his shadows lie darkest, outlining the misshapen and broken lives, the misshapen and defeated dreams, of men and women.

So I protest Miss Lowell's dictum—*It is idle to ask if the greatest poetry can be built upon such negative lines.* It is true she adds: *This poetry, though "cribbed, cabin'd and confined" to a remarkable degree, is undeniably, magnificently noble.* The affirmation of the work she seems not to have discerned. And so I must protest the note on which Mr. Clement Wood leaves his fine critique: *With a philosophy based on the single postulate that man has failed, upon a denial at core, the eternal limitations to the highest flight has already been named. . . . For the poet to whom life is dungeons,*

and whose words photograph this dungeon-life around him, we need not look for wings to split the sky, and fan the embers of the stars. His wings are broken on the bars; the black despair of his heart-song is magnificence enough.

I submit that such comment, apt and generous as it is, leaves untouched the heart of the poet's meaning. Mr. Redman, in his excellent monograph of Robinson, brings us nearer to the poet's central intention when he quotes from a letter written by Robinson in appreciation of an early review of *The Torrent and The Night Before:*

> I am sorry to learn that I have painted myself in such lugubrious colors. The world is not a "prison-house," but a kind of spiritual kindergarten, where millions of bewildered infants are trying to spell God with the wrong blocks.

I believe Mr. Robinson still sees the world as a kind of spiritual kindergarten. As Man Against the Sky he questions still:

> Shall we, because Eternity records
> Too vast an answer for the time-born words
> We spell, whereof so many are dead that once
> In our capricious lexicons
> Were so alive and final, hear no more
> The Word itself, the living word
> That none alive has ever heard
> Or ever spelt,
> And few have ever felt
> Without the fears and old surroundings
> And terrors that began
> When Death let fall a feather from his wings
> And humbled the first man?
> Because the weight of our humility,
> Wherefrom we gain
> A little wisdom and much pain,
> Falls here too sore and there too tedious,
> Are we in anguish or complacency,
> Not looking far enough ahead
> To see by what mad couriers we are led
> Along the roads of the ridiculous,
> To pity ourselves and laugh at faith
> And while we curse life bear it?

And if we see the soul's dead end in death,
Are we to fear it?

It is, I think, recognition of Robinson's central intention and of the large significance of his vision that brings Mr. Redman to his just and admirable summary of the poet:

> Professor Santayana has lamented that "our poets are things of shreds and patches. They give us episodes and studies, a sketch of this curiosity, a glimpse of that romance. They have no total vision, no grasp of the whole reality, and consequently no capacity for a sane and steady idealization." It is because I believe that Edwin Arlington Robinson has, precisely, this total vision, this grasp, and this consequent capacity, that I can think of him only as the greatest poet whom this country has yet produced.

We of America have need of such a singer. His acridity is tonic; his clear passion an irrigant for malignancy; his wise revealment of the slow processes of the universe a cool hand laid on our destructive hasting; his faith a superb challenge:

We do not feel—
We dare not feel it yet—the splendid shame
Of uncreated failure; we forget,
The while we groan, that God's accomplishment
Is always and unfailingly at hand.

Light in Darkness—the burden of his song—brings music from the sun. We may not listen, but the note is there, triumphant through the clamor of wasted excellence. In the pride of his self-sustained vision that *flouts deformity and laughs at years* Robinson, though singing to few men, may speak to Robinson as he makes Rembrandt speak to Rembrandt:

Well, if God knows,
And Rembrandt knows, it matters not so much
What Holland knows or cares.

It matters little to Robinson what America knows of him, but to America it should matter much that a poet of her nurture, standing stark against the glare and chaos of our sky, knows, and has in rich measure let us know, something of an orient Word that will not be erased.

THE MYTH OF AUTOMATIC PROGRESS

BY ARTHUR CORNING WHITE

The worship of the Idea of Progress is the great dynamic religion of the modern world. Like the worship of any other fetich, it is based on faith alone. To honest mysticism I have no objection. An æsthetically perfected mysticism is the acme of the arts. But I actively distrust the spurious mysticism on which pseudo-sociological charlatans premise most of the specific reforms current propaganda brazenly flaunts before our eyes. These naively optimistic gentlemen with characteristic effrontery label their hopes logic and pathetically try to bolster up the most grotesque hypotheses by facts.

To the normal human, progress means change in some direction. To most people it means movement in a desirable direction. And to those who take stock in it, progress means movement in a direction considered desirable by the majority of the human race. Now as a matter of historical record this cheerful conception that mankind by its own Liliputian efforts can improve its situation in a Brobdignagian universe is really quite new.

It occurred, to be sure, to Plato. But Plato turned it down. Pythagoras admitted sporadic progress, but this was offset by a subsequent retrogression to a point forever static. Ethically, man wandered around in a circle. Most of the Greeks believed in a Golden Age in the past. So, too, the Romans—e. g. Seneca. The idea that feeble man by his own volition and strength could alter the conditions of life, either one way or the other, would have seemed a gross presumption to them. Juno brought Aeneas to be vamped by Dido, and Venus dragged him away. To the ancient world, Fate, sometimes as a deity, often not, was always and forever omnipotent.

The Middle Ages regarded life as offering a chance to a small minority, by ascetic conduct and much scourging of the buttocks with whips, to win happiness in heaven after death. Such, in essence, is the teaching of Jerome, Boethius, and even of Dante himself. This philosophy at least had the advantage

of letting the normal, contented, sinful majority muddle along in happy dalliance. The disquieting, evangelistic minority were so engrossed with the business of saving their souls from eternal damnation, they had no leisure, except for an occasional crusade to decimate the infidels about Jerusalem, to reform the morals and improve the minds of their neighbors. They felt, too, that an attempt at reform would be fruitless anyway, for not man, but an All-Wise Providence, determined the ways of the world.

In the Renaissance, though, there is a hint of the Idea of Progress. For in the Renaissance grew up a pernicious confidence in the capability of reason. Petrarch in letters, Bacon in science, fostered it. But most leaders of thought still clung to the idea of a better past than present or future. They read the classics with idolatrous awe. There were men like Trissino in Italy, Bossu in France, Rymer in England. If they could approach the glory of their classic models, they would achieve enough.

But Copernican astronomy and the theory of evolution increased man's perspective. Plato had thought the life of the world was limited to about seventy thousand years and that in his day the course was more than half run. Now we know the possibilities for humanity's longevity are infinite. The Greeks, failing to note any evidence of progress in their simple, short history, and believing with Plato that life had only a brief space to run, naturally saw no prospect for a better world.

We now have a long past behind us and a longer future ahead. As a result, superficial people observe that the early Greeks shaved occasionally with bronze razors and that the rite obviously must have been extremely uncomfortable. They observe that we moderns use a safety razor, oftener, and with less jeopardy to our epidermis, though we still do it by hand. Ergo—will come a day when we shall be barbered electrically as we breakfast daintily on predigested food. Progress! It's obligato of Reform! For these remarkable electric shavers must be made accessible to all, and this consummation can

only be reached through the activities of innumerable paid secretaries and circulators of petitions.

All this is a fallacy. If the goal of man is the acquirement of steel mechanisms, electrically operated, to supplant his own physical members, then we certainly have progressed. We also have achieved free radio lectures on such subjects as "The Immensity of the Universe" for the titillation of the popular mind. We shall eventually conceive our offspring antiseptically. Our decadent appendages, such as teeth, will no longer be used. But if the goal of man is spiritual content, either for the few or for the many, then this new revolutionary Idea of Progress is grotesque indeed.

To make progress, as I mentioned at starting, one must move in some specific direction. A circle is not enough. There must be a destination which is not also the point of departure. Progress toward such a destination may be either good or bad, depending on the nature of this goal. Right here's the rub. To determine the nature of this goal one must define it. The definitions I have heard thus far have either been too particular to appeal to any considerable number of people, such as a world run by a theocracy of some particular church, by the single-taxers, or by the gentlemen in Moscow, or else they have been too nebulous for any sane man to understand. They're like the Prior's definition of the soul in Browning's "Fra Lippo Lippi." They mean nothing at all.

This is inevitable. For the attainment of the goal implies happiness. Stevenson calls happiness a continual aspiration for something you can't have. "To travel hopefully is better than to arrive." Another man writes that happiness is the fulfillment of desire. A third says it's the balance between desire and attainment. While there's no unanimity as to what happiness is, we can't possibly know whether we're getting it.

And even if we could agree on a definition, an event unthinkable, we should still have to determine, by examination of the past, whether we are approaching our goal. We should have to do this before we had the least logical assurance we

were progressing in the right direction. Now we can easily catalogue objective changes, styles in dress, for example, but I defy any man to tabulate the nuances of spiritual experience. No one can do it for himself for a single hour with any approach to accuracy. How can we hope to do it for the human race over eons of years?

Humanity, of course, is moving. Perhaps, as Pythagoras thought, in a circle. Or it may be on its way somewhere. But whether it's headed toward a fuller life and happiness, or toward misery and death, nobody knows. And the delicious humor of it all is this—that nobody ever will.

COLERIDGE AS A PHILOSOPHER

BY JOHN HENRY MUIRHEAD

Nature and Aesthetics

The main problem of the philosophy of Nature in Coleridge's as in Cudworth's day was the sufficiency of the "corpuscular philosophy" to explain the phenomena of life and mind. We have seen how the earlier idealism sought to solve it by proving that life could not spring from organization but was presupposed by it. How far Coleridge was influenced by Cudworth's speculations it is impossible to say. In his own time these were receiving illustration from a group of physiologists, of whom Dr. John Hunter was the leader, and the allusion, amounting to a dedication to Dr. Hunter, in the posthumous essay entitled "The Theory of Life"[1], is sufficient evidence of the influence that the teaching of the great anatomist had over Coleridge. Coleridge, however, was dissatisfied with the form in which that teaching had been left—"the undeniable obscurities and apparent contradictions to be found in his (Hunter's) works"; and proposed to "climb up on his shoulders and look at the same objects in a distincter form because seen from the more commanding point of view furnished by himself."

He starts by rejecting current definitions of life, even that which makes it consist in assimilation, growth and reproduction. Finally, he defines it himself as "the principle of individuation." Wherever you have this, you have something that goes beyond mere mechanism. He does not deny the existence of mechanism, but distinguishes it from what he calls life, as organization from without; "whatever is organized from without is a product of mechanism; whatever is mechanized from within is a production of organization."[2] So defined, he finds life to be a property of matter throughout the entire

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[1]See *Miscellanies Aesthetic and Literary.*

[2]*Op. cit.,* p 385. n.

gamut of its forms, beginning with elements or metals[3] and going on through ever higher forms of crystals, the great vegetable and animal deposits, vegetables and animals as we know them, up to man in whom "the whole force of organic power has attained an inward and centripetal direction." We think of individuation as a process of separation and detachment; but Coleridge insists throughout on the opposite tendency to interconnexion as an inseparable element in it, just as centripetal power is necessarily presupposed in centrifugal. It is this productive power that makes life incapable of mathematical treatment. But this does not exclude it from science as Kant would have it; for whose aphorism that science ends with mathematics Coleridge would substitute the truer one, that "the full applicability of abstract science ceases the moment reality begins."

In the vital series thus depicted as a "grand scale of ascent and expansion" Coleridge conceives of each higher stage not as merely superimposed on the lower—e. g., life on mechanism, nor as merely employing it, but as assimilating it to itself by a process which "presupposes the homogeneous nature of the thing assimilated." On any other supposition we should have a miracle comparable to that of transubstantiation—first annihilation then creation out of nothing.

If we enquire finally through what forces the individuating principle acts, Coleridge points to magnetism, electricity, chemistry or constructive affinity as the highest that science has as yet succeeded in discovering; but he holds it conceivable that these may be found to be reducible to some other which will be more akin to life.[4] Meantime, he notes, all of them illustrate what he regards as the most general law governing the action of life in every one of its forms—the law of polarity or "the essential dualism of nature," for it is always in the identity of two counter powers that "life subsists; in their strife

[3]The nugget of gold is not life, seeing that its form is accidental and *ab extra;* but gold itself is life, seeing that it is an organized system of qualities ultimately activities; for "life is an act."

[4]*Op. cit.,* p. 400.

it consists; in their reconciliation it at once dies and is born again into new forms, either falling back into the life of the whole, or starting anew in the process of individuation."[5]

It is easy to criticise the theory of Nature here set forth as an undue extension of the concept of life and a hypostatizing of Nature.[6] What is philosophically valuable in it is, in the first place, the emphasis on the presence in all material phenomena of a principle that goes beyond anything that can properly be called mechanical; secondly, the conception of this principle as operating throughout the whole extent of nature, manifesting itself in ever higher forms, which constitute real differences of kind and not merely of degree; nature, as he puts it, ascending "not as links in a suspended chain but as the steps in a ladder," assimilating while transcending what has gone before; thirdly, the interpretation of the law of the universe, in harmony with this conception as "a tendency to the ultimate production of the highest and most comprehensive unity." This unity itself must consist of individuals, finding their own completeness in proportion as they unite themselves with the whole and reflect its perfectness. But it has a more particular interest when taken in connection with Coleridge's theory of art, which ultimately rests on the affinity here emphasized between nature and spirit.

There was no department in which the defects of the Hartleian philosophy were more glaring than in æsthetic theory. Imagination is dismissed in a short paragraph in a section devoted to "Dreams." The sense of Beauty is treated of under the head of "Pleasures and Pains of Imagination."[7] Beauty in nature is explained as a transference of "miniatures" of pleasant tastes, smells, etc., "upon rural scenes"; beauty in art, including poetry, as the result of successful imitation of nature. When, as in the professed writers on "Taste," the hard-worked principle of Association was combined with hide-

[5]Page 393.
[6]See Dr. Watson's *Preface. Op. cit.*, pp. 356-7.
[7]*Observations on Man*, Part I, iv, Section I.

bound adherence to the neo-classical modes and the social snobbery of the time, it is easy to imagine what the result was likely to be.

It did not require an acquaintance with the great contemporary revival of æsthetic philosophy in Germany to convince Coleridge of the fatuity of the whole system of British æsthetics; and Saintsbury is undoubtedly right in waiving the whole controversy as to the relation between him and the Schlegels, and in setting down the resemblance as "mainly one of attitude—one of those results of "skyey influences, which constantly manifest themselves"[8] in different persons of genius and talent more or less simultaneously. Saintsbury is speaking of Coleridge as a critic—"one of the very greatest critics in the world"[9]; but what he says of him in this capacity in respect to the Schlegels is true of him in his capacity as philosopher in respect to the æsthetic theories of Kant and Schelling, of which these critics may be said to have been only the most popular exponents.

Yet it may well have been under German influence that in a letter of October, 1800, he writes of an "Essay on Poetry" as more "at his heart" than anything else. What he felt was required was first a psychology that would explain the working of imagination as not merely a reproductive but a creative process; and, secondly, a metaphysic that would account for the appeal which its creations make to what is deepest in the heart and mind of man.

1. Coleridge had reflected profoundly on the process by which poetic images are generated in the mind. No psychologist has ever had a better opportunity of first-hand observation of it, and there is no reason to believe that he owed anything at all here to German philosophy. He had broken with the associational philosophy, but he had no intention of discarding association itself as properly interpreted. What he

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 396, n. 1. See the whole passage as in general harmony with the view taken in this study as to Coleridge's relation to German philosophy.
[9] Saintsbury, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

was led to hold as opposed to the current intellectualistic account was "that association depends in a much greater degree on the recurrence of resembling states of feeling than trains of ideas." From this it at once followed that "a metaphysical solution (like Hartley's) that does not instantly tell you something in the heart is grievously to be suspected." He adds with a flash of his usual insight:

> I almost think that ideas never recall ideas, as far as they are ideas, any more than leaves in a forest create each other's motion. The breeze it is that runs thro' them—it is the soul of state of feeling. If I had said no one idea ever recalls another I am confident that I could support the assertion.[10]

One regrets that he did not do so, but in these statements, under which, as he says, "Hartley's system totters," it is not difficult to see an anticipation of recent reforms in the psychology of association. What we have since learned is that the dominating factor in the process of suggestion, whereby imagination bodies forth the forms of things both known and unknown, is not the temporal or spatial adjacency which the psychologists call "contiguity," but "continuity of interest"—the emotional occupation of the mind with a significant idea, summoning from the depths of its experience the elements necessary for its expansion into a whole of meaning. British psychology in Coleridge's time was as yet too undeveloped to provide a complete scheme, not to speak of a language, into which such a doctrine could fit. It was all the more to his credit that he was able to break away from existing schemes and affirm a principle which made them thenceforth an anachronism.

2. But to have demonstrated the place of emotion and interest in the process of revival was only the first step in the required reconstruction of æsthetic theory. If the work of imagination is merely revival, poetic creation is still unexplained. It was in taking this second step, probably, that Coleridge found help in his study of Kant's *Critique of Pure*

[10] *Letter to Southey*, Aug. 7, 1803.

Reason. Whatever difficulties and ambiguities attach to Kant's doctrine in general, it is unambiguous in its recognition of a productive as well as a reproductive form of the imagination, to which he assigns not only an inherent activity of its own but (in the results of that activity) "something of the fruitful and inexhaustible character of noumenal reality."

It was for just such an extension of its functions that Coleridge was looking; and when he came upon it in his early excursions into German philosophy he eagerly seized upon it as giving him the desired clue. But it was only a clue. For if, as Kant held, the work of the imagination was continuous with that of the understanding, merely preparing the way for its exercise in the wilderness of the sensory manifold, and if the understanding in the end gives us no more than a world of appearance, a like limitation would have to be imposed on the deeper faculty. Under such conditions it would be impossible to find in the work of the poet and artist any analogue to the creative intelligence of which the world is the embodiment. Unless the activity of the productive imagination were conceived of as in some way identical with that of the Divine Imagining, it would be impossible to justify the claim of poet and artist to be seers and revealers of essential reality.

It was just this identity that Schelling[11] had sought to establish in opposition to the element of subjectivism in Kant and Fichte. Nature according to Schelling was not the creation of mind, it was mind, albeit as yet in unconscious form. Nature in the narrower sense of which science speaks is not the thing-in-itself. Natural science abstracts from the meanings which Nature symbolises and takes it as something merely finite. It is the function of art, therefore, as representing a higher level of the primeval activity of which both nature and mind are manifestations, to portray directly and concretely what science and philosophy can describe only abstractly. From the point of view thus reached it is possible to represent the work of the imagination as continuous not merely with the understanding,

[11]Schelling's *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur* was published in 1797.

as Kant did, but as continuous with the creative work of the divine intelligence itself.

We can understand how, when he came on all this in Schelling, Coleridge seemed "to have found his own dream." He was unfortunate in the term "esemplastic," which he invented by a mistranslation of the German Ineinsbildung;[12] he was still more unfortunate in the plagiarized passages from Schelling which he prefixed as a kind of *apparatus criticus* to his own theory of the imagination: but he made no mistake in the value he attached to these ideas for a true theory of art in general and of poetry in particular.

With this clue Coleridge comes to the definition of the poetic use of imagination. He admits that there may be poems which have pleasure for their immediate object. The admission has puzzled some of his critics, who have failed to notice that the pleasure he alludes to is of a peculiar kind, corresponding to the satisfaction of no casual appetites but to what he elsewhere calls "the two master impulses and movements of man,—love of variety and love of uniformity." He allows further of poetry, such as we find without metre in Plato, Isaiah, Jeremy Taylor, and even in scientific treatises which have truth for their immediate object. In this wider sense poetic imagination would be synonymous with the genius which he describes in the *Friend* as the power "to find no contradiction in the union of old and new; to contemplate the ANCIENT OF DAYS and all his works with feelings as fresh as if all had then sprung forth at the first creative fiat," which "characterizes the mind that feels the riddle of the world and may help to unravel it." But he was not the man to confuse powers in reality as different as the purpose and the material are different; and he goes on to give his idea of the work of the poet "described in ideal perfection."

To those who take little interest in psychological analysis or philosophical theory such a description naturally appears

[12] In *Anima Poetae*, p. 236, he substitutes esenoplastic, a better form, without noting the mistranslation in the other.

to be merely ringing the changes on verbal distinctions.[13] But this is to forget the devastation which the emaciated accounts current in Coleridge's time of the work of the imagination had spread in men's minds upon the whole subject, and the necessity of an energetic assertion of the presence of the element of passion combined with penetrative reflection, fundamental sanity of judgment, and a form of expression that would give some sense of the inner harmony of the material presented to the mind and therewith of the essential truth of the presentation.

In view of all this there is no clause in the definition which we would willingly spare, however differently modern taste might desire to have it expressed. The account errs rather by defect than by excess, seeing that it contains no detailed reference to the kind of diction which Coleridge conceived of as essential to poetry ("the best words," as he elsewhere expresses it, "in the best order") in the sense in which he is here using the term. But he does not forget this, and in his discussion of it later in the *Biographia,* particularly in his criticism of Wordsworth's heresy, he makes ample amends. This falls outside of our subject. What we have here to note is the liberation which this new insight into the nature and the work of imagination brought to his own mind and the confidence with which it inspired him in all he afterwards wrote whether as poet or critic.

While Coleridge was more interested in poetry than in the plastic arts, and first developed his theory of the imagination with a view to a true understanding of what was greatest in it in his own country, he has left fragments which enable us to see how he applied these ideas to art in general. In his essay on *Poesy or Art*[14] he closely follows Schelling in his discussion of the sense in which art is imitative. If the function of the imagination is to unite sameness with difference, art can never consist in merely copying nature. Mere sameness as in

[13]See J. W. Mackail in *Coleridge's Literary Criticism.*
[14]Shawcross, ii. p. 253.

a waxwork disgusts because it deceives. True imitation, as compared with mere copying, starts from an acknowledged difference. Starting from this, every touch of nature gives the pleasure of approximation to truth. But the truth is not to nature in the limited meaning of the word as the object of mere sense experience. The world we meet in art is the world of sense, but it is the world of sense twice born, and appearing in that "unity of the shapely and the vital which we call beauty." It is this uniqueness and intuitiveness of the experience which makes it something wholly inexplicable by "association." It often depends on the rupture of association. So too with interest. So far from being derivable from interest in the narrower sense of the term, "beauty is all that inspires pleasure without and aloof from and even contrary to interest."

It is here that Coleridge's idea of Nature as above expounded comes to his aid. Nature may be looked at as a dead mechanism and again as a creative force. This is recognized in the old distinction between *natura naturata* and *natura naturans*. It is not the former that art imitates; this would be mere idle rivalry. "Believe me you must master the essence, the *natura naturans*, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher sense and the soul of a man." Nature truly is thought and intelligence, but "the rays of intellect are scattered throughout the images of nature." Man's mind on the other hand is the focus of them all. "To make the external internal, the internal external, to make nature thought and thought nature—this is the mystery of genius in the Fine Arts." Otherwise expressed, the imitation must be of that which is within. "The artist must imitate that which is within the thing, for so only can he hope to produce any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect."[15]

As the theory of "imitation" so the whole vocabulary of the old æsthetic took on a new meaning when interpreted in the light of these ideas. The merit, such as it was, of the

[15]See A. D. Snyder in his *Theory of Imitation* as an illustration of the union of opposites (identity and difference); *op. cit.*, pp. 50ff.

writers on taste was the recognition of the place in genius of the power of emotional response to the "skyey influences" which they called sensibility. Their weakness was that they tended to interpret this as a form of self-consciousness. In a view like Coleridge's the emphasis was on depth of feeling, but it was feeling for a world in which the self in any merely personal sense no longer occupied a place but had long since "passed in music out of sight."

So finally with taste. Taste there must indeed be by which the genuine can be distinguished from the spurious, "the proper offspring of genius from the changelings which the gnomes of vanity or the fairies of fashion may have laid in its cradle or called by its name."[16] But the word is burdened with associations derived from its primary sensory meaning, especially of passivity and natural instinctiveness, and thus fails to bring out the dependence of the thing in experienced meditation and the acquired power of recognizing, as intuitively as the trained scientist recognizes truth by its own light, words and images fit to give "the touch of nature" to the material in hand. It is this defect that Coleridge seeks to remedy in the definition he has given of taste. Taste he tells us is

> an attainment after a poet has been disciplined by experience, and has added to genius that talent by which he knows what part of his genius he can make acceptable and intelligible to the portion of mankind for which he writes.[17]

And again it is

> such a knowledge of the facts, material and spiritual, that most appertain to his art, as, if it have been governed and applied by good sense, and rendered instinctive by habit, becomes the representative and reward of our past conscious reasonings, insights and conclusions.[18]

It is for this reason that there can be no rules for the exercise of taste any more than for imagination. "The rules of

[16] *Biographia Literaria*, ii. p. 65.
[17] Quoted from Shawcross, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 281.
[18] *Op. cit.*, ii. p. 64.

Imagination are themselves the very powers of growth and production. Could a rule be given from without, poetry would cease to be poetry and sink into a mechanical art."

It was in this way that Coleridge carried the theory of beauty in nature and art, and especially in the art of poetry, as far beyond anything hitherto current in England as he carried the art of literary criticism beyond anything that had been achieved by his predecessors. Yet this union in him of a genius for criticism second only to the very greatest with the meta-critical craving for a theory of æsthetic has aroused the same suspicion among literary men as the union of the poet and the metaphysician already discussed.[19] To those who hold that æsthetic theory is a species of "Bohemian glass" and distrust its "false subtlety," or who accept Schlegel's witty definition of it as "the salt which dutiful disciples are going to put upon the tail of the Ideal (enjoined upon them as so necessary to poetry) as soon as they get near enough" will be prepared to ask with Saintsbury[20] whether Coleridge is not "just so much the more barren in true criticism as he expatiates further in the regions of sheer philosophy," or even with Mr. J. W. Mackail[21] to reject his whole theory of poetry as "a large incoherent abstraction inapplicable and fortunately unapplied by him to the body of the criticism of which it is the introduction." But this would be wholly to mistake the function of a philosophy of beauty and the distinction between it and the art of criticism. The distinction is not, as Saintsbury would have it, "that Philosophy is occupied by matters of the pure intellect; and literary criticism is busied with matters which, though not in the loosest meaning, are matters of sense."[22] It is true that philosophy is concerned with theory, but since the theory is of life in all its departments, it is concerned with will and feeling as well as with intellect. It accepts these experiences, the moral, the æsthetic, the intellectual: the sense

[19] Above. p.
[20] Who quotes these criticisms. *Op. cit.*, pp. 353, n. 6, and p. 396.
[21] *Coleridge's Literary Criticism.* Introduction. (London, 1908.)
[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 142.

of duty, what Saintsbury calls "the amorous peace of the poetic moment," the love of truth, as its data. If any of them is not there, philosophy cannot give it. Theory or no theory, each man has to depend on his own sensitiveness to the distinctions involved in the particular form of experience. What philosophy seeks to do is to understand wherein this unique quality consists; what it implies as to the world which is thus experienced; and, finally, how these experiences and the worlds that correspond to them are related to one another. It may be able to go but a small way in this, but it is bound to go as far as it can and is at least justified in going so far as to indicate the falsity of theories which, like that of the Associationists in the present case, not only fail to understand but would dissolve the experience altogether by resolving it into something quite different. If there are "Happy Warriors" for truth and beauty, who find the appeal to the heart that has "felt" sufficient, and who can afford to neglect such defensive theorizing, there are others less happy whose minds are disturbed and their feelings confused by inadequate theories and to whom more adequate ones may be a real help to full enjoyment.

Quite apart from this, moreover, there are those to whom metaphysic may itself be a form of "that immortal fire which," as Saintsbury eloquently puts it, "each generation keeps burning to soften what is harsh, feed what is starved, anoint and cheer and clean what is stiffened and saddened and soiled in the nature of man."[23] We know at any rate that these were the things that Coleridge sought and thought that he found in metaphysics. "What is it," he asks,[24] "that I employ my metaphysics on? To perplex our clearest notions and living moral instincts? To extinguish the light of love and of conscience, to put out the life of arbitrament, to make myself and others worthless, soulless, Godless? No, to expose the folly and the legerdemain of those who have thus abused the blessed

[23] *Op. cit.*, p. 334.
[24] *Anima Poetae*, p. 42.

organ of language, to support all old and venerable truths, to support, to kindle, to project, to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings diffuse vital warmth through our reason—these are my objects and these my subjects. Is this the metaphysic that bad spirits in hell delight in?" If there are those to whom these words make no appeal it might be well for them to ask whether the fault is in Coleridge or not rather in themselves. For the particular metaphysic of beauty with which we are here concerned we need not be deterred even by the great authority of the writers I have named from claiming its due. Fragmentary as it is, eked out, as at one time it certainly was, by studies from Kant and Schelling, it marks a new starting-point in British æsthetic. It gives us for the first time in England the elements of a theory in the light of which the poetry that, along with political freedom, is her most characteristic contribution to civilization can be better understood, the enjoyment of it can be made a more understanding enjoyment.

CURRENT THOUGHT

Characteristics of a Liberal Theology

In an article entitled "The Place of Christ in Modern Theology," read during Dedication Week at the Chicago Theological Seminary last June, and published in the April number of the *Journal of Religion,* Professor Eugene W. Lyman presents an interesting analysis of the essential features of liberal theology. "There are three characteristics which I suspect we all want in any theology which undertakes to be modern and liberal," he writes. "The first of these is that theology should be concerned for depth and richness in religious experience and for its fruitfulness in all of life. The religious experiences of reverence, of faith, of the mystery of human life, of the wonder of the universe, of kinship with God, of a Divine Spirit indwelling in the lives of men—it is these experiences that theology exists to interpret." Its home is man's sense of the infinite, his hunger after righteousness, his sense of humility and dependence, his experience of frustration and tragedy. "The first postulate of modern theology should be that religious experience, rightly interpreted, results not in disillusionment but in discovery, not in repression of life but in its fulfillment, not in inertness in the face of great issues of mankind but in alertness to discern them and in resourcefulness for meeting them victoriously."

The second characteristic places religious thought in an historical setting: "it should recognize the deep rootage of religious experience in history and should interpret religion's present meaning and future development in the light of this fact." At present we tend to minimize the imporance of history in favor of natural science. "But it will go ill with theology and religion if they become controlled by this mood. . . . All culture is nourished by history. The destruction of the Alexandrian library by the Caliph Omar, which squandered great historic achievements in culture, was the kind of deed which has made for barrenness in Islam. The Dark Ages, so far as they really were dark, were so because of the burial of the treasures of history in the débris left by barbarian invasions. The important revivals of Christianity have always been nourished by a fresh discovery of the essential greatness of its history."

The third characteristic is religion's need for a comprehensive philosophy in which religious experience is correlated with all other fields of human experience and knowledge. The author quotes the apt observation that "religion without theory is religion without intellect." This synthesis, however, cannot be effected by naturalism. "Rather must it be through a spiritualistic philosophy that the new synthesis is effected. In other words, if humanism, mysticism, and our theories of the cosmos are to be composed into a unified world-view, we must give metaphysical meaning to personality, reason, purpose, ideal values, and spiritual community, and find in these realities indispensable clues to the meaning of the whole of reality. The third postulate for modern liberal theology is the metaphysical kinship of the human spirit with ultimate reality. On the basis of this postulate

theology may go forward to achieve a comprehensive philosophy, in which physical nature, history, ethics, art, and religion may be brought together into a coherent and fruitful unity." The author is undoubtedly sound in insisting that no philosophy of religion can be ultimately acceptable, in spite of present experiments in this line, which omits the claims of the religious and ideal aspects of selfhood to legislative importance.

Logic, Personality, and the New Age

The inaugural lecture by Professor John Macmurray, on appointment to the Grote Chair of Philosophy at the University of London, appearing in the April issue of the *Journal of Philosophical Studies* under the title of "The Unity of Modern Problems," makes an interesting analysis of the place of logic and the concept of personality in modern history. Pointing out that if philosophy is to be taken seriously it "must have a definite relation to history," and that philosophy "is useless to us unless we can see through it," he observes that the philosopher "needs above all to be sympathetically sensitive to the wide range of human interests, because it is this as a whole that he is bidden to systematize. He must give a single answer, and for that he must formulate a single question. Therefore his first problem is to discover the unity of problems."

Heralded by the fall of mediævalism, reechoed in Luther's challenge that "the just shall live by faith," and Descartes' "Cogito, ergo sum," the primary—and "profoundly Christian"—principle of Selfhood and personal freedom has become this underlying issue: "For modern philosophy the problem of the Self is the fundamental problem, and the centre of reference for all others. In the attempt to solve it, we find, when we look through the history of modern philosophy, two distinct periods, each curiously self-contained, corresponding to two epochs in European history; and perhaps, though this is guesswork, a third which is just beginning. It is admittedly difficult to date historical periods, not so much because they overlap, as because the later period grows up within the other, and is at length born from it. But it is at least symbolically true to say that the first of these two epochs is closed by the French Revolution and the second, we must hope, by the Great War of 1914-18. From our present point of view, which is theoretical, these two epochs are defined by their conception of the Self, and by the resulting form which their self-realization finds for its expression. In each, because the conception of the self is an inadequate one, the triumphant assertion of the new idea, and the self-expression in terms of the new idea with which the period commences, passes gradually from the optimistic idealism of its beginning through a phase of experimental realism to failure, disillusionment, and scepticism."

The form which the doctrine of Personality takes in these two great epochs is determined by the logic accepted by the period. Thus "The logical schema of this first epoch of modern history is mathematical. Its formula of understanding and of construction is the formula 1 plus 1 equals 2. It believes that this formula expresses the fundamental character of reality." All units are alike, each getting its status from its place in the series,

and the series being ordered by something outside itself. Thus the social, political and æsthetic theories of the 18th century—the theories of Bishop Butler, Hobbes, Louis XIV, the literature of Pope, Voltaire and Swift. "Everywhere the logical schema is the ground-plan of understanding and construction. The Self, conceived mechanically learns to behave mechanically, and produces the mechanical age. . . ."

The break-down of the logical schema of numerical quantity leads to the 19th century's adoption of an organic logic. The concept of the Self now changes from that of a Substance to that of an Organism. Unity is now found in diversity of function, parts get significance by functioning in and for the whole. Two defects are inherent in this concept, however. First, "by its stress upon the essential differences between the elements in a complex, it destroys their individuality." Second, because "The organic whole, as a whole, and in terms of itself, is functionless." The individual takes on value in the whole not as an individual but as a butcher, or baker, or candlestick maker. The whole is thus a series of organic functioning parts, but the whole itself has no function. The State is a Will—but whose? The General Will? But the General Will is blind impulse, not will at all; and this observation introduces the scepticism of the State. After all, insists the author, "The important thing about a man is that he is a man—not that he has a social function."

The new age, however, is approaching with a new logic and a new philosophy of personality. Already youth "are beginning, experimentally, and with many failures, no doubt, to feel their way to a higher conception of the Self, upon which to base the deliberate organization of their lives—a conception in which they are persons, and in which the personal relationships dominate, control, and subordinate all organic functions—a conception whose key-word, perhaps, is friendship. . . . The new concept may well grow painfully and slowly within the body of an earlier epoch, and be born in due course in an even more frightful agony than the one we have lived through. But whatever happens, the unity of modern problems is the problem of discovering or constructing (in this connection the terms are synonymous) a new schema of the Self, which shall transcend both the mechanical and the organic schema; and which will enable us to construct, consciously and deliberately, a civilization whose mechanical and organic structures will be at the service of a personal life, whose meaning and essence is friendship." The coming era, in other words, is the personalistic age.

—W. H. L.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

An Australian Poet

One of the live men in the University of Adelaide, South Australia, where he is head of the English department, is Sir Archibald Strong, who for five years served the government of the Commonwealth as censor of cinematograph films (1916-21). Born in Melbourne half a century ago, he went with his father, professor of classics there, to Liverpool University, and got an English schooling, passing finally from Liverpool University to Magdalen in Oxford. Besides giving the world some studies in literature, particularly in Beowulf and in Shelley, he has brought out a volume of Poems, "Sonnets and Songs," and "Sonnets of the Empire." He is recognized in *The Austral Garden of Verse,* but the selection he chose for me as representative of his best consists of the following studies in

GREY.

I

Lady of sorrow! What though laughing Blue
  Thy sister, mock men's anguish, and the Sun
  Glare like an angry judge on many a one
That longs for night his bitter shame to rue?
Yet dost thou grant thy mercy of mist and dew,
  Thy cloudy grace, ere day's revenge be done,
  Weaving over the morn's red malison
Thy veil of peace with pity trembling through.
When all light loves and all brave hues are flown,
  When beaten hope falls from the reeling flight,
    And life is lone upon her desolate way,
  And moon is fierce, and no men see aright,
Then weary eyes turn unto thee, their own,
    Lady of Grief, the soul's Madonna, Grey.

II

Yet not in sorrow only art thou fair:
  For joy may know and love thee in the fall
  Of spray that slumbers on the waterfall,
Or in low cottage-smoke in evening air,
Or in brave stone carven in glory rare,
  Or when the tender mists of autumn fall
  Dappling the mead with beauty, and the tall,
Stark dreaming oaks thine ancient livery wear.
Yet none hath known thy loveliness aright
    Save him who, gazing in his lady's eyes,
Sees dim lists tossing with plumes of many a knight,
  And woods where elfin waters glint and glance,
  And all the vision and faith of old romance,
    And the great dream of youth that never dies.

Students of Shakespeare and our earlier literature will sympathize with Sir Archibald's return to the color grey, as more spiritual in its suggestions than the more emphatic and dazzling blue.

JAMES MAIN DIXON.

Along the Bookshelf

For the Love of Plato

THE EPINOMIS OF PLATO, translated by J. HARWARD. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1928. Pp. 146. $1.70.

THE PHAEDO OF PLATO, translated by HON. PATRICK DUNCAN. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1928. Pp. 175.

THE HIPPIAS MAJOR ATTRIBUTED TO PLATO WITH INTRODUCTORY ESSAY AND COMMENTARY, by DOROTHY TARRANT. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1928. Pp. x-lxxxiv; 104.

Lovers of Plato will welcome this new translation of the *Epinomis*, not only because it is exceedingly well done but because of the introduction which gives us the strongest reasons for believing it to be a genuine work of Plato. In this the author has a long and powerful prejudice to overcome. Nevertheless his arguments are cogent and it was very much worth while, since scholarship seems in a more liberal mood, to call our attention to them.

The work was worth doing if for nothing more than to remind us of the distinction of the Greek spirit in contrast with the Hebrew:

> Unfinished though the work is, it is possible to get from it a notion of the form which Plato's answer to the question what is wisdom took at the close of his life. His attitude is different from that of the Hebrew poet, who regards the Divine Wisdom as thwarting and opposing the speculative activity of man, and whose teaching bids man confine himself to feelings of awe and wonder at the vastness of the universe, at its irresistible forces, at the elaborate adaptations shown in the various forms of life, and, for the rest, to be content with the negative virtue of departing from evil. Plato would have been shocked at Milton's conception of God as a 'Great Architect' who
>
> Did wisely to conceal, and not divulge
> His secrets to be scanned by them who ought
> Rather admire.
>
> The *Epinomis* rests on a conviction that the higher powers of man's intelligence are the most valuable part of his endowment; that one purpose, if only a subsidiary purpose, which is working in the great system which surrounds us, is the development of these powers; and that man's environment is so framed as to draw him on from the simplest lesson in numbers to the highest flights of which thought is capable.

A new translation of the *Phaedo* of Plato is always an event and that of Patrick Duncan is of special interest to readers of this magazine by reason of the excellent notes and appended essays by the translator. One of these, on *The Theory of Ideas in Plato*, sets forth the distinction

between the personal realism of Socrates and the idealistic concept of the Platonic ideas. This realism was embodied in the Socratic "existence-in-itself." He conceived of personality as realized in the *act* of *willing, doing, creating, perceiving* and *living.* Thus the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo* is demonstrated not by the existence of *a priori* ideas but by its own exercise. It acts in an immortal fashion and therein demonstrates its immortality:

> In other dialogues we find the immortality of the soul deduced from other principles, but here it is made to rest, as its ultimate ground, solely on this particular doctrine of reality. Stated simply, the doctrine is this—that the really existent is not that which appears to us through the senses, in an endless process in time of coming to be and passing out of being, but things outside and beyond this process, apprehended by thought or reason, by participation in or connexion with which alone the endless flux of the sensible can have meaning and enter into our rational experience, and apart from which there is nothing but the endless flux of Heraclitus, where nothing can be said to be or not to be, or can be named or thought or spoken about.
>
> It is noteworthy that neither here nor in any other dialogue does Socrates lay down this as new doctrine, or indeed make it the main object of any philosophical demonstration. It is brought in as something known (see the references above, p. 119) which Socrates knows will be assented to by his hearers, as an admitted principle on which to rest arguments for the proposition which he is trying to establish—in the *Phaedo* for the immortality of the soul, in the *Republic,* in Book VI for the distinction between knowledge and opinion and in Book X for the theory of mimetic art.
>
> The main interest of Socrates was not in cosmology but in man (Aristotle, *Met.,* 987b). His early inquiries in physical science had shown him that explanations of physical phenomena by physical causes led nowhere in the search for reality. That must be found outside the Heraclitean stream of coming and ceasing to be, which swept everything visible and tangible along with it, and he therefore took the step which marks the beginning of modern philosophical inquiry, and turned away from seeking the real in the things of sense to seek it in thought or judgment (*Phaedo,* 99e).

What do we mean when we say of a particular thing that it is beautiful or great or equal? Obviously we do not mean that the particular thing is actually the beautiful, because we see it at one moment beautiful, or as anything at all. It is therefore in these things which are, just by themselves, what they are, not now more and now less, but always the same beyond change, which the soul apprehends by herself, that the reality is found. Nothing else really is but only in appearance. But this existence is not apprehended by sense. It is pure, i. e., uncontaminated by the material element which is the object of sense perception, but it is only in so far as a knowledge

of it is awakened in the soul by our sense perceptions that these can have any real or rational being for us.

Dorothy Tarrant adds to the stream of Platonic interest a new edition of the *Hippias Major*. The book is well printed, with copious notes on the Greek text and an introduction in which is discussed the genuineness of the Dialogue. The author inclines to the belief that it is the work of some of Plato's disciples, although she declares it shows a point of philosophic development between the earlier and later genuine dialogues of Plato. The introduction is well-studied and shows a good acquaintance with the field of criticism and the various theories of the scholars. R. T. F.

Is Idealism Dead?

A PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALS, by Edgar Sheffield Brightman. Henry Holt and Company, N. Y. 1928 Pp. 243. $2.00.

The above title might well be that of Dr. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, successor of Dr. Bowne at Boston University in his recent work, *A Philosophy of Ideals.*

He points out the fact that since mind is the medium through which alone we can see our world we must in the end come back to it and receive it as one portion of reality.

Browning's Paracelsus predicts his resurrection in the words:

"Though I plunge into a dark tremendous sea of cloud
Some day I shall arise."

There are many evidences that the submersion of idealism so effective since 1910 (since we have been talking as if philosophy began then) has already begun to pass, and this book is of course one of the many evidences. This revival is inevitable since all our problems must in the nature of the case begin with ourselves, our own minds:

> The psychological observer is restricted to his own mind. No amount of present experience or of introspection will give him an immediate view of another mind. Sense-perception of the behavior of the bodies of other people gives you necessary and valuable clews to their minds; but the clew is not mind itself. It distresses the scientific conscience of many a psychologist to have to build his science on first-hand data which are strictly confined to his own mind. But this distress is imposed by the nature of experience and psychologists should endure it manfully instead of seeking to escape from it by the expedient of trying to find mind as something that can be perceived by the senses.
>
> We can observe and control stimulus and response; but the psychological fact is neither stimulus nor response nor their combination in the reflex arc, but it is rather what happens in consciousness during the whole process. Consciousness of the stimulus is not the same fact as the stimulus; and consciousness of the response is not the same fact as the response.

This forms perhaps the main reason that psychology can never be

the pure science that many of its devotees pretend it to be, never in a sense similar to that of the other sciences.

In the chapter on Nature the author discusses the change in concepts arising at present in the field of the philosophy of science. This change has indeed, while many scientists have been unconscious of it, made the old way of thinking of nature impossible:

> Science is becoming skeptical of its own mechanistic presuppositions. Max Planck writes that the development of physics has led us "away from the mechanical conception generally." P. W. Bridgman confesses that "many will discover in themselves a longing for mechanical explanation which has all the tenacity of original sin"; this "is unjustifiable." R. S. Lillie renews the suggestion often made by Royce and others that the apparently rigid mechanical laws of nature are but a statistical regularity, and that "ultramicroscopic phenomena . . . give evidence of an ultimate indetermination, . . . i. e., of control by individual action." Claude Bernard's *Experimental Medicine* holds to determination in biology but refers the ultimate determination of life to the metaphysical world in which freedom is possible. Now, these tendencies in science do not unambiguously point away from a metaphysical and toward a positivistic view of nature; they may only indicate a radical change in the character of scientific metaphysics. But at least they indicate that the pure mechanism of much modern science is on the wane and that a new metaphysics is being shaped. Moreover, the indetermination and freedom of which we are now hearing is more characteristic of mind than of physical matter as we have known it, so that the newer views are at least readily compatible both with a positivistic view of nature and with an idealistic metaphysics.

His discussion of ideals is equally cogent:

> If naturalism only asserted that some ideals are false and some are true it would be telling us no news. But it goes further and asserts that reality is indifferent to all ideals. In so doing it contradicts itself; for unless reality in some way embodies ideals akin to those of scientific thought, science—even the science of behaviorism—cannot be true, and naturalism has no standing ground. But if reality truly conforms to ideals set up by scientific thought, there is no reason, in principle, why it should not conform to the ideals of the good and the beautiful, as well as the scientifically true. Naturalism, then, is provincialism in thought; it consists in taking a part of man's idealizing thought for the whole. It pretends to rest on experience, yet it ignores a large part of experience. It pretends to rest on science, yet its logic would deny the ideals which make science possible. Like all provincialisms and narrow patriotisms, it is shortsighted and self-refuting. But men keep on believing in it, for the way of ideals is very hard and the apparent hostility of nature to ideals is evident.

A portion of the book comprises recent lectures on the John M. Flowers foundation at Duke University and throughout the argument is carried forward on a very high plane with a large degree of open-mindedness. The positions taken seem to us unassailable and we have here an important contribution to the present movement of thought. One is sure to lay down the book with a hope that Dr. Brightman will write often and at greater length in that process of idealistic development which he describes in the chapter on Tasks Confronting Contemporary Idealism. In the performance of these tasks we have no doubt the author himself will take a great place. R. T. F.

Glimpses of Metaphysics

THE REALM OF ESSENCE, by GEORGE SANTAYANA. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y. 1927. Pp. v-xxii; 183. $3.50.

Mr. Santayana has now completed the second and key volume of three which promise to comprise a definite and classic statement of his philosophy. *Skepticism and Animal Faith* has been published, and *The Realm of Matter* is subsequently to appear. Rumor has it that in a recent lecture in England on the subject of Essence, Mr. Santayana, in spite of cross-examination, succeeded admirably in keeping the exact nature of it a profound mystery. *The Realm of Essence,* subtitled "Book First of Realms of Being," however, removes all virtue from the complaint. It is fair to conclude that, if the author's inimitable and enticing treatment of Essence fails to enlighten and satisfy, the task is hopeless. What Mr. Santayana offers us, although he clearly warns us that in many respects he is far from the Academy, is a pure Platonism minus its traditional moral hierarchy and the Platonic cosmology. In his own words, "The only veritable idealism is Platonic."

Essences comprise ultimate and pure Being. They are "self-enclosed and insulated, ultimate and eternal," intuitively discovered, non-existent, infinite in number, identical, and individual. They involve no implication, and cannot be discovered in their naked realm by dialectic. Dialectic and implication are possible only so far as experience has revealed essences conjoined in the material world. The author characterizes them as follows:

> Facts, however momentous, are transient and local, and truths, however eternal, are relative to these transient and local facts; but every essence, whether it ever have or not the adventitious dignity of a truth, is in its own right a something—a verse or a letter in that infinite Koran sealed from all eternity in the bosom of Allah, of which the trembling angel of life may read to us a few Surahs. That it should be these and not those is the tragic mystery of our fate, and of all existence; that others also should some day be manifested in other worlds or to other spirits, would be a further decree of fate; but that all should lie for ever in the realm of essence is a luminous necessity raised far above any accident of destiny or

> decree of power. It could not be otherwise. If you deny that realm, you acknowledge it. If you forget it, you consent that it should silently laugh at you in your sleep. . . . Considered in itself, essence is certainly the deepest, the most inevitable, form of reality.

Whatever other forms of idealism may have in criticism of Mr. Santayana's position, at least his thought is a spiritually refreshing and renewing breeze in an age hot with the desolation of conditioned reflexes, biological categories, and nominalistic psychologisms. What he offers us is a profound reaffirmation of the home of spirit and the integrity of the mental nature, liberating us from those who, "being overawed by the facts, and eager for existence and prosperity, miss the liberal life; they prefer perpetual servitude, if well fed, to emancipation, such as interest in pure essences affords:"

> Spirit bloweth where it listeth, and continually undoes its own work. This work of free expression, this drift of sensations, passions, and ideas, perpetually kindled and fading in the light of consciousness, I call the Realm of Spirit. It is only for the sake of this free life that material competence and knowledge of fact are worth attaining. Facts for a living creature are only instruments; his play-life is his true life. On his working days, when he is attentive to matter, he is only his own servant, preparing the feast. He becomes his own master in his holidays and in his sportive passions. Among these must be counted literature and philosophy, and so much of love, religion, and patriotism as is not an effort to survive materially. In such enthusiasms there is much asseveration; but what they attest is really not the character of the external facts concerned, but only the spiritual uses to which the spirit turns them.

There are profound reasons for believing that "matter" is not so alien to "essence" as Mr. Santayana suggests. Were his own surmisings correct, his animal faith would remain suspended in mid-air, like Socrates in the basket. Perhaps, too, he has failed to face squarely the difficulties proposed by Plato in the *Protagoras*. Selfhood, too, would seem to hold a precarious and not enviable position in the system he is expounding. Be that as it may, Mr. Santayana's exposition will remain a classic expression of one serious, high, and venerable way of thinking.

W. H. L.

THE METAPHYSICS OF PRAGMATISM, by Sidney Hook. The Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago. 1927. Pp. 144.

By "pragmatism" the author of this essay refers to the philosophy of Peirce and Dewey. The thesis sustained is that an instrumental theory of thinking implies a definite metaphysics. The forms of thought, the categories, the "leading principles" of science, types of mathematics, are as "objective" as anything else in nature, and get their character not from a transcendental realm of timeless being or a subjective world of

mind, but from nature itself. The argument grounds in the postulate that where two or more theories regarded as self-consistent refer to the same state of affairs, they have an identity in logical form, such that it is possible to translate the content of one into the content of another (like the frames in relativity physics). Thus mind is never working with purely Platonic entities or purely subjective thoughts, but with a content derived from objects, from nature: "Thinking is an instrument whose exercise is *conditioned by* certain structural organizations in nature." Logic, as well as mathematics and physics, is objectively grounded: "how we think furnishes significant indications of the general nature of what we think." This is essentially Woodbridge's theory of objective mind. "If logic declares itself to be the language and grammar of things, then its declensions must reflect the forms of things and its tenses and moods their functions and activities." Or as elsewhere put, "our *implicative* sense, just as our visual and auditory sense, is what it is because of what the world has been. If the principle of the syllogism is true it is because some things in nature have behaved or can be ordered syllogistically. . . . *Laws* of logic are linked up in some way with certain functional and structural *invariants* in the world of existence." This point of view restores our faith in the objectivity of science: "The intelligibility of any deductive system or even of a solitary definition demands at some point an *objective* signification." The author's argument is grounded in epistemological realism and instrumentalism. But unless he admits at the outset that mind has no nature of its own he can go no farther, and such an argument as the following loses any potency: "The fact that the geometrical *order* is *applicable* to a set of existent entities proves that geometry, no matter how 'pure,' is not underived and unrelated to the subject matter it orders." The author, of course, is held by his hypothesis to an empirical frequency theory of probability. In spite of Poincaré, it may be observed, there remains some question whether the fact of non-Euclidean geometries has destroyed the contention of Kant that traditional geometry is based on a set of synthetic *a priori* axioms.

The book is well written and indicates a grasp of both naturalistic instrumentalism and the literature in epistemology and logic. It is unfortunate that it is marred by numerous typographical errors.

W. H. Long.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY, edited by Joseph Ratner. Henry Holt and Company, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 560.

There is something intangible about the writings of Mr. Dewey, in spite of the homely illustrations of which he makes frequent use. Such is in part to be expected where a pioneer is introducing new points of view and yet is forced to use old terminology. The matter is partly the fault, however, of the scattered character of his writings. For many, in spite of his pre-eminence in contemporary American thought, he remains little

more than a tradition, or, if known, merely as an instrumentalist logician, or a pragmatic moralist, or a philosopher of education. It is time that we were permitted to see Professor Dewey as a whole man. Mr. Ratner, under the sanction of his author, has done us service by putting into the covers of one volume representative writings from the pen of this leading thinker. It is not to be expected that such a volume could be free from inadequacies and scrappiness. Nevertheless it fills a felt need and, coming as it does with Professor Dewey's approval, comprises the most representative and complete statement of his philosophy extant. The Open Court Publishing Company has indicated rather unusual sportsmanship in permitting a more than generous amount of quotations from the recent *Experience and Nature*. The present volume contains representative writings on philosophic method, metaphysics, logic, ethics, education, politics, art and religion. W. H. L.

Adventures in Ethics

THE MORAL SELF, by CHARLES L. SHERMAN. Ginn and Company, N. Y. 1927. Pp. 365. $2.50.

THE NEW MORALITY, by DURANT DRAKE. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 359. $2.50.

ADVENTURES ON THE BORDERLANDS OF ETHICS, by RICHARD C. CABOT. Harper and Brothers, N. Y. 1926. Pp. 152.

Purposive, creative, moral personality is the central fact around which must be built all moral, social and pedagogical theory and practice. This principle is profoundly justified by Professor Sherman in his book *The Moral Self*, a splendid and satisfying account of Personality in its biological, psychological, social, moral and religious relations. True to the deepest insights of human life, this volume unites good sense, moral idealism, sound scholarship and an intensely practical attitude. The author never permits himself to become lost in a morass of psychological theory, and in particular has avoided barren physiological explanations. Essentially personalistic, his interest is always living and practical, and competing psychological theories are frequently briefly described and waived aside as irrelevant to the conclusions which all of them must accept. The following random quotations indicate the pithy epigrammatic style and viewpoint of the writer:

> Moral adjustment, especially in its highest form, will require a degree of organization that is really creative.
>
> Moral delinquency is often traced to the absence of mental content.
>
> Until the union of ideals, feelings, and tendencies toward virtuous behavior has been largely attained, there is no moral nature or moral self in any true sense of the word.
>
> Early education may be the greatest enemy of education.
>
> There is probably no true moral sympathy that is not based on self-observation. . . . That which one clearly perceives to be worth

while for himself he will perceive to be worth while for other selves.

The highest products of the self must be earned. No one may ever attain freedom without a real desire for freedom.

The fact that present-day moralists have lost faith in the innate existence of a conscience, a power of moral intention, and the like does not make a developed conscience any the less necessary.

Overscrupulousness is often just evidence of the fact that the moral self has been spoiled in the making. Fortunate is the individual who is able to combine moral unity and mental flexibility.

The moral ideal is moral unity and affective spontaneity combined in one personality.

The primary aim of education is not the immediate improvement of society or the social order, but the betterment of self.

A moral purpose on the part of the individual is the only true source of human betterment. The individual must have a desire to direct himself—self-direction. Self-direction, in order to be successful, demands an ideal, a purpose, and a decision.

We must do our own thinking. A virtuous life cannot be imposed upon us. . . . Real education is largely self-education.

Seldom can realism in art be employed to teach a moral lesson.

The enemies of religion are not the thinkers and the scientists but those who are not strong enough to reconstruct their early religious beliefs.

A well-developed interest or sentiment for the home will not fail to offer moral sustenance to other interests and sentiments that normally find their beginning in the home.

Drudgery is not conducive to good ethics.

No one can become truly moral without engaging in some constructive occupation or profession over a long period of time. Wise educators of all ages have sanctioned the learning of a trade. . . . Idleness always weakens morals.

The volume is scarcely successful as a text for beginners. It is too condensed, closely written, and presupposes a maturity of outlook. But it furnishes a wealth of practical wisdom for the mature reader. It suggests forcibly that in that neglected field, the fine art of life, psychology and pedagogy must more closely co-operate with purely theoretical ethics.

The New Morality, by Durant Drake, is an exceptionally readable little book on practical morality. The cover tells us that it is one of a series of volumes on "philosophy for the layman," but it is just the kind of vital book college students would find an object of genuine interest. The contents are divided into three parts, the first and third constituting a sort of introduction and epilogue. Part one discusses "The old morality and the new," in which the dialectic of supernatural morality and moral skepticism leads to "Natural morality" based on human reason and insight. Two chapters on "The irksomeness of duty" and "From Puritanism to Freud" attack the problem of moral effort and seriousness, the author concluding:

> We want no unnecessary pinching of life, no asceticism, no intolerance. But life sooner or later demands sacrifices from us all; and those sacrifices we must be ready and willing to make. Self-control is one of the most important of the virtues; and we must ever be grateful for the Puritan strain in our inheritance.

The theoretical background of Professor Drake's position, namely, that the end of life is happiness, has been generously challenged. It might be pointed out that "happiness" after all is a mighty abstract term, and is as ambiguous as that of "self-realization" which he attacks so vigorously. Not *mere* happiness, surely, but *significant* happiness must be regarded as the end, and the introduction of the word "significant" introduces considerations which are of special importance in regard to the epistemological theory implicit in ethical philosophy.

The body of the volume comprises part two, dealing with "Some questionable aspects of current morality." Here the author deals with unerring profundity and clarity with such problems as self-indulgence and luxury, lawlessness and crime, intoxication and bootlegging, marital failures, irresponsible parenthood, corrupt politics, selfish business, privilege, suppression of opinion, poisoned journalism, demoralizing art and literature, dogmatism and indoctrination, race prejudice, war and isolationism.

Part three is entitled "morality and the future." The author is reservedly optimistic:

> After all, since morality is, at bottom, only common sense, it seems reasonable to believe that with the breaking down of repressive authoritative codes and ancient tyrannies, with the accumulation of knowledge, and the spread of education, men will succeed in establishing for themselves a saner and more abundant life than has yet on any large scale been realized on earth. But we have certainly not yet reached a point of safety. There is likely to be no progress unless men work for it. We must be willing to discard our present loyalties, if better ways offer themselves, just as we discard old ways of lighting, heating, or locomotion when new ways are invented. There cannot be progress without a price. We must have faith enough to give us courage and incentive, but not the sort of faith that is complacency. Perilous problems lie before us, and relatively few are awake to the perils. Our future still is in question, and the outcome rests, in part, with us.

The reader will agree that Professor Drake has written with a lucidity only equalled by good sense, giving way neither, on the one hand, to a vacillating conservatism, nor, on the other, to a flippant and high-handed radicalism. Sanity and idealism after all are both a pleasant and a useful combination when ethical problems are in question.

In addition to achievements in medicine, Professor Richard Cabot of Harvard University has earned an enviable reputation as a wise counsellor and inspirer of life, both among his students of social ethics and his wider reading public. The group of casual essays comprising the little volume *Adventures on the Borderland of Ethics* have previously appeared in

magazine form, but are deserving of a wider public to which they now appeal. The first essay is "A plea for a clinical year in the course of theological study" whereby the student preparing himself for a life of religious service will be given practical training in sympathy and counselling, "experience," as he puts it, "in applied theology, in the practice of gospel Christianity." The second essay discusses "Ethics and the medical profession," in which the author notes certain changes and transformations in the ethical code of the medical fraternity. The next essay deals with "Ethics and Business," and the following with "Ethics and education," in which the author pleads for courses in ethics which will not only give cultural training, but, in his own words, "I hope to do in ethics what any competent music teacher does in music, namely, to stimulate men to grasp for themselves something which includes the best that I know." The viewpoint that ethics is a merely "cultural" study he "abhors." A final essay deals with "Ethics and Social work." W. H. L.

Miscellaneous

GREEK RHETORIC AND LITERARY CRITICISM, by W. Rhys Roberts. Longmans, Green and Company, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 164. $1.75.

Again the series, *Our Debt to Greece and Rome,* lays the cultured man in its debt by publishing W. Rhys Roberts, *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism.*

The work is historical in its nature, bringing together the various treatises on Rhetoric from the time of Gorgias and Socrates to that of Longinus. An interesting side-light is thrown on the development of rhetoric and grammar and their place in the developing civilization of the period. For teachers of public speech this would form an excellent handbook to place with their students since it gives not only the history but also the principles of public speaking as viewed by the early orators and litterateurs. R. T. F.

TOWARDS THE OPEN, A Preface to Scientific Humanism, by Henry Chester Tracy, with an Introduction by Julian Huxley. E. P. Dutton & Company. 1927. Price, $3.50.

Towards the Open is an eloquent appeal for recovering the zest of life by penetrating beneath the artificialities of civilization and our educational routine. "The open towards which we are moving, is a more natural and a freer life in which a man's responsibility is measured by his real relation to his social-natural environment (as shown by the allied sciences bearing on that relation), and his value is measured by his real capacity, discovered under treatment to which he is entitled as a man" (p. 244). Humanism is given a large interpretation as all those stimuli which set free and develop the capacities of human nature and serve to integrate it into a harmonious whole. The problem is to save a man's soul. "A man's soul is now seen as the whole structure and

intention of his life. Clearly it cannot be 'saved' by incantations. The saving process had best be begun when the structural process begins; and always in one way: by developing the power of choice" (p. 107). From the beginning the educative process should establish rapport between the developing capacities of the individual and the environment—not just the conventional environment, but the first-hand environment of nature and of human beings. This does not mean that the human organism is to be thought of as infinitely perfectible (p. 116), nor does it mean that human nature can arrive everywhere at the same result. But for all it should be made possible to "respond to the laughter of the flowers" (p. 236), to find satisfaction in "participation in what for us is imperishable and divine, even though our immediate impression of it is conditioned by processes in nature, by the very wave-beats of time" (p. 243). The author recognizes that great progress has been made in the early stages of education. It remains to extend it to later stages and to every day life. J. E. Boodin.

DANTE'S CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE, by Allan H. Gilbert. Duke University Press, N. C. 1927. $2.50.

To understand the close dependence of Dante upon the theological conceptions of Thomas Aquinas one needs to read Professor Gilbert's *Dante's Conception of Justice.*

As Aquinas gathered the rising tide of Aristotelianism into the channels of acceptable theology, so Dante using the language of the common people made the theology of Aquinas the current and popular conception. It is interesting, therefore, to have set before us item by item the comparisons which show the use which Dante made of Thomistic thought.

It would be interesting if it could be accurately estimated to know how deep a debt the Thomistic theology did owe to Dante for its popular and final acceptance. But these trends and movements were inextricably mixed, being of a part with that reviving world of science and letters which owed more to Aristotle than to any other single mind. Though some of these movements were themselves destined to settle into outlived form, at the time they were very fresh, very radical and epoch-making.

Though there can be said to be no dearth of Dante literature yet the emphasis of the Thomistic connection is worth doing and Professor Gilbert has done it well. R. T. F.

A LITERARY HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN FRANCE, by Henri Bremond. The Macmillan Company, San Francisco. 1928. Pp. 423. $4.50.

Bremond's, *A Literary History of Religious Thought in France,* is a scholarly though somewhat disingenuous account of the development of humanism within the orthodox circles of the Roman Catholic Church. The author spares no pains and goes the extent of the widest circles to

prove his point, which seems to be a defense of what might be called this *orthodox* humanism in contradistinction from all others and to the detriment of the latter. Still it is good to hear the other side of the controversy, especially if one be Protestant, since it never harms to hear the contrary argument at its best. And this work is exceedingly well done and in a most fascinating style. And who shall be able to decide between these controversialists of another age? Least of all, it seems to us, those who assume perfection of goodness in aim or accomplishment for the side he represents. Here the author falls into the fallacies of this kind of writing, whose only correct species of humanism was the orthodox. Moreover, the attempt is made to prove the point by marshalling fragmentary excerpts from many writings and appeal is made for the proof of the honesty of the discourse by the unabashed boldness and "nerve" of its claims or by the literary style of the writer.

We do not get the full force of the disingenuousness of the author, however, until we come across this description of the Jesuits:

> The Jesuits were standing on the defensive against unscrupulous opponents determined to strangle them by any or every means, clumsy moreover and absolutely inviting a trouncing.

It is difficult to believe that the author is serious or honest at this point. In fact the controversy between Jesuit and Jansenist cannot be altogether cleared by a survey of literary documents. A deeper commentary has already been written, namely the commentary of history—the commentary of deeds. It is impossible honestly to claim perfection for either party to the controversy and the thought of both are foreign to this age, but the fact remains that the fight against the Jansenists was a battle against freedom of thought within the church and this volume succeeds in affirming rather than in denying that fact.

R. T. F.

THE SYMBOLIC PROCESS AND ITS INTEGRATION IN CHILDREN, by John F. Markey. Harcourt Brace and Company. 1928. Pp. 192.

This monograph presents evidence to indicate the importance and nature "of the social processes in the genesis, integration, and functioning of symbols." The point of view sustained is a methodological behaviorism combined with an emphasis upon wholeness and integration characteristic of the Gestalt School. Symbolism, according to this view, is a conditioned process in which the social environment acts as the original stimulus. "Symbols are integrated in a social behavior process and their content is action. . . . Casual relations are demonstrable and presuppositions of a physical and chemical basis are valid. Thus the symbolic process is to be explained mechanistically. It is an observable process and subject to check by objective quantitative methods. Scientific laws and prediction are possible and demonstrable in this process, yet there result discoveries, inventions, creations, and new configurations unpredicted before they occur." This view holds to the theory of "a

continuity between man and the other animals regarding this process." It considers man a talking animal because he has proper biological equipment, not because he has something to say. One may grant the author the importance of the social environment in the origin of speech, but there is still something of legerdemain in those theories which attempt to explain speech as a set of conditioned reflexes. The author has reviewed extensive material dealing with case studies in the development of words in children, one of the most important features being an analysis of the mental content of the child by reference to its word responses. The evidence indicates that symbolic processes must be built upon the basis of a primal recognition of "self" and "other," this arising only in a social environment.

THE DEMON OF THE ABSOLUTE, New Shelburne Essays, by Paul Elmer More. Princeton University Press, N. J. 1928. Pp. v-xiii, 183. $2.50.

This little volume comprising the first of the New Shelburne Essays, is noteworthy as marking the return of its author to the field of literary criticism. The title, "The Demon of the Absolute," is taken from the first essay which attacks that general point of view expressed in such fraternizing movements of thought as "the fetish of pure art" which preaches moral irresponsibility of the artistic impulse, naturalistic monism, æsthetic and moral relativism, and mechanistic rationalism. Against this many-headed hydra Mr. More, as usual, wields a keen blade, and effectively lops off from the Absolutistic torso theories of "emancipation," irresponsibility, the spirit of "freebooting romance" in literary criticism, and immoralistic cynicism. "I suspect," he writes, "that these sticklers for the liberty of taste against the judgments of mankind are in the main simply uneducated." That is not the whole story, however. Another cause is "the indolence, moral in some, intellectual in others, that revolts from such discipline as would enable a man to judge between the higher and the lower pleasure; it is the conceit that makes him cling tenaciously to his naked temperament as a better guide than the voice of tradition." Something of the Hegelian dialectic seems to be the result of Mr. More's penetrating analysis of the modern literary revolt:

> The submergence of the humanistic conception of man as a responsible creature of free will has been accompanied by an emergence of the romantic glorification of uncontrollable temperament; and this has been supplanted by a realistic theory of subjection to the bestial passions, and this, at the last, by an attempt to represent life as an unmitigated flux, which in practice, however it be in literature, means confinement in a mad-house.

The second essay, "Modern currents in American literature," gives a pungent analysis of the new school of writing, with an especially well-aimed and well-justified thrust at the left wing which includes such men as Anderson, Dreisser, Dos Passos, and Lewis. Whether their work be that of "splattered filth . . . an explosion in a cesspool," "shameless exhibi-

tionism," a "miscegenation of the gutter and the psychological laboratory," defense mechanisms functioning as excuses for moral indolence, or "the unleavened impudence of noice" of the "brawling vulgarians" (Mencken), the movement is to be traced to the mid-West prairie states where gentlemen from "Oshkosh and Kalamazoo, even of Chicago," set the intellectual and æsthetic pace. The abortion in American letters comes as a result partly of the desire of the mid-West to contribute something original to the stock of culture, and more effectively to the lack of cultural education among the disciples of the new cult.

The third essay is "A Note on Poe's method," in which the author, as usual, hits the bulls-eye:

> Health is above disease in art as it is in life. Poe remains chiefly the poet of unripe boys and unsound men. . . . Yet it is to the honour of Poe that in all his works you will come upon no single spot where the abnormal sinks to the unclean, or where there is an effort to intensify the effect of what is morbid emotionally by an appeal to what is morbid morally. The soul of this man was never tainted. How much that means, how great and near was the danger, can be known by turning to certain of his Continental disciples.

The remaining essays are "My debt to Trollope," "George Borrow," "Henry Vaughan," and, finally, a delightful translation of *Savitri,* that little gem embedded in the Mahabharata. Mr. More has been, and will always remain, a great figure in American literary criticism. He has been a noble and beneficent influence in an age in which literary incense is burned before Baal. It is unfortunate that when profundity and keenness of thrust blend so happily the author is not more widely read.

W. H. L.

AN ANTHOLOGY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHY, by Daniel Sommer Robinson. Thomas Y. Crowell Co., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 674. $4.00.

The sub-title of this book very well expresses its scope: "Selections for beginners from the writings of the greatest twenty century philosophers with biographical sketches, analyses and questions for discussion." The selections are, with the exception of James, Royce, Creighton, Bradley and Bosanquet, all from living writers. The only non-English writing philosophers included are: Bergson, Croce, Driesch, Spengler, Wobbermin (on Nietzsche) and Vaihinger. Part one gives a series of selections on the definition and scope of philosophy, then follow, successively, selections on Idealism, Realism and Pragmatism. Under each of these headings the selections deal respectively with the development of the general standpoint, its solutions of the problems of knowledge and existence, truth and error, body-mind, and values. Part five gives selections illustrating various types of theory not falling under any of the three main headings.

The selections have been judiciously chosen, the analyses and questions well done; and the book will be found very convenient for either general readers or college students. *Credo experto.*

Joseph A. Leighton.

CIVILIZATION, by Clive Bell. Harcourt, Brace and Company, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 264.

The well-known writer on nineteenth century painting gives, in this brilliant little book, his conception of what civilization means, and how one might be made under present industrial conditions. Not often can a conscientious reviewer endorse the publisher's blurb. In this case I am glad to do so. "The book is entertaining in the best sense, witty, and always provocative . . . lucid and companionable, crystallizing the thought and outlook of a man whose ideas are always very well worth attention."

After a delightful introduction, Mr. Bell proceeds to arrive at an answer to the question—what is civilization?—by elimination since barbarous peoples exhibit the ordinary social virtues, civilization is not any particular kind of social moral order. To determine what civilization is he studies chiefly three shining examples of highly civilized society—Athens from 480 B. C. to 323 B. C.; Italy in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries; and France from about 1653 to the Revolution. There have been others; notably the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries, Ancient Persia, and China in the Tang and Sung dynasties. Periclean Athens is the supreme example.

The paramount characteristics of a high civilization are a sense of values and the enthronement of reason. A sense of values obtains when men recognize that the highest goods are the pleasures derived from the contemplation of beauty and scientific and philosophical truth, good manners, tolerance and freedom from fanaticism and dogmatism, sweet reasonableness or sweetness and light. Liberal education is the indispensable instrument of civilization; social freedom and leisure its conditions. Moral dogmatism, excessive social regulation and patriotism and the utilitarian attitude expressed in the gospel of work and money-making are its chief enemies. The finer values of beauty, knowledge, and reasonableness exist only in the emotions and thoughts of individuals. Therefore complete freedom in thought and its expression are necessary for civilization. It is disseminated only by highly cultivated many-sided spirits, who think clearly and feel intensely. "Men of action" are barbarians, and a society in which *action* is given the highest place is barbarous.

Inequality is necessary to civilization, but it is not incompatible with socialism. It has flourished under aristocracies (in Greece) and despotisms (the Renaissance and eighteenth century France). Whether a social democracy might be civilized we do not know, since there has never been an instance. Mr. Bell would prefer a social democracy which nourished and supported a highly cultivated minority which might ooze sweetness and irradiate light down to the mass. He thinks a society in which there were no rich and none suffering want would be nearest the ideal. A stationary population would be necessary; therefore birth control.

Mr. Bell's attitude in regard to values is much the same as Walter Pater's a refined intellectualistic Epicureanism, but with a livelier social consciousness. He carries out this attitude consistently in his treatment of the relations of the sexes, for example. However one may disagree with

Mr. Bell one must acknowledge the genial learning, insight, wit and charm of his little book. JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON.

THE VISION OF GOD, by NICHOLAS OF CUSA, translated by Emma Gurney Salter with an introduction by Evelyn Underhill. E. P. Dutton & Co., N. Y. 1928. Pp. 130.

Who still survives among us that reads intelligently and religiously and profits by such mystical writings as Cusa's *Vision of God?* To the average modern it is as unmeaning as Gothic architecture which is understood only as a vague consciousness of beauty. It is as if the ticks of life has swept out leaving only the impression of dead stone. Yet every great work of man has had its vitality and he who would be wise must know it and endeavor to understand and appreciate it. The Vision of God is such a work as this and Emma Gurney Salter has conferred a favor upon scholarship in putting it in English. Will the day of mysticism ever return to the world? It is difficult not to think so. It is even more difficult to imagine the return of the old type mysticism as in Longfellow's "Bells of San Blas":

Out of the shadow of night
The world rolls into light;
It is daybreak everywhere.

Nevertheless a new mysticism must arise if the world is not to sink into moral darkness. Mysticism is grounded in the deep conviction of the reality of the unseen and invisible forces which determine human destiny and value. Wherever there is deep conviction there is worthy art, worthy literature, worthy institutions, wherever it is lacking these fall away. Because this is true there is need for the perpetuation of the work of all the great mystics.

The difficulty as we wrote in the beginning is with the modern understanding. The reviewer has read this book in bed and found invariably that two chapters would produce drowsiness while five was a guaranteed, full soporific. R. T. F.

THE RELIGIOUS MIND, by C. K. MAHONEY. The Macmillan Company, N. Y. 1927. Pp. 214.

Although this volume will be of interest to the technical student, its chief appeal will be to the general reader who wishes to find a thoroughly readable, popular, and wholesome book in the field of the psychology of religion at once straightforward, sympathetic, and reverent. The author, formerly minister in the Methodist Church, now professor of philosophy and psychology in Dakota Wesleyan University, has the good fortune, from the standpoint of the reader, of being himself intimately acquainted with religious experience. He is perfectly in the right in insisting, in the introduction of this book, that the student of religion must himself have lived intimately in the field; the aloof examiner who deals in pathological cases and animal psychology will in the end prove incapable of a wholesome and comprehensive mastery of it.

Assuming that there is such a thing as normal religious experience and mentality, and that it is at once the essential object and end of inquiry,

the author proposes here to indicate the contributions of psychology to religion, "to study the religious mind in its (normal) functioning, rather than merely phases of religious experience." In the Introduction an interesting analysis is made of certain weaknesses of method and tradition in current procedure in the study of the psychology of religion. These involve the belief that the non-religious and aloof examiner is best qualified to study this field, the belief that the subject is best approached through animal psychology and the study of pathological cases of religious experience, the over-zealous use of the questionnaire method which results in a pathological and unrepresentative type of case, and, finally, what might be called the "psychological omniscience complex," that the psychologist has the right to depart from his specific field and pose as a master of all knowledge.

The thirteen subsequent chapters deal with an analysis of conscious and subconscious mentality, types of religious experience, religious motivation, historic expressions of religious aspiration, religious belief, religious thinking, ethicized religion, conversion, growth in religious experience, religious education, religious significance of recent psychology, and the achieved experience. One of the most interesting sections is that found in chapter three, in which the author presents a list and analysis of the types of religious mind. Following Professor Norman E. Richardson of Northwestern University these are classified into the traditionalist, the critical type, the mystic, the executive type, the dogmatic propagandist, the ritualist (or aesthete), the ascetic, and the reformer.

This book is available for the general reader who wants a sober, instructive, and inspiring discussion of religion as enriched by psychology. Several glaring blunders have been overlooked by the proof reader. The book is also covered with that notorious binding for which the publisher is now becoming known. This however is not the fault of the author.

W. H. L.

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY, by T. V. Smith. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. 1927. Pp. vii-x; 339. $3.00.

Two postulates underlie the historical and philosophical analysis of *The American Philosophy of Equality* by Professor T. V. Smith of Chicago University. The first is the author's conviction that the principle of equality which has been a cornerstone of American life and tradition is too valuable to be abandoned. The second is that traditional philosophical theories supporting it are no longer acceptable and sufficient. In support of these claims an interesting historical survey is presented. The conclusion is that neither the doctrine of natural rights, the Christian doctrine of the soul, Kantian and Utilitarian ethics, nor Idealistic naturalism any longer provide adequate defense of the principle of equality:

> The equality of men, as based upon their measurable aspects, proves untrue; as based upon their immeasurable souls unsafe.

> Such a dilemma has made the conception of a given soul an object of suspicion. This growing distrust, while quite outstanding in current psychology, is not limited by any means to psychology. In every field of modern interest the influence of Darwin has at last been felt. Even ethics is fast reconciling itself to a world where flux infects the very self of man. And what is more to be remarked on, theology itself has felt the influence, in some quarters being merely alarmed, in others impressed, and in still others converted. Political and social theories have remained longest immune; but a conception that is being discarded in every other field does not promise well as an abiding foundation for political and social concepts. Needed, then, by struggling classes a basis for equality that will be at once logically adequate, socially safe, and practically effective.

The author accepts a full-fledged naturalism, finding his chief inspiration in Dewey and Mead: "The first contribution of Darwin is that man is really an animal," a claim with which Professor Smith is in hearty agreement. The inference from the study of evolution is that

> Since man is what he is by virtue of an unbroken development from lower forms of life, whatever distinguishes him from these lower forms must have been attained in the process of evolution itself. Man's interest, if he would understand himself, is thus shifted to, and fixed upon, the process. And rather than looking for an 'essential attribute' within to account for his assumed superiority, man must henceforth look to such observable characteristics as his erect posture, his opposable thumb, and most of all to his use of language.

The mechanism of social progress he discovers in Mead's theory of the "vocal gesture."

> Starting as an active physical organism in a physical environment, each member of the human species acquires a 'soul.' The group is the source, the vocal gesture, the most obvious constituent of the mechanism.

The author accepts the doctrine of "functional equality," that the true value of the claim of equality lies in its fruits and, in this case, the fruits are manifest. The essence of functional equality is cooperative activity, which, for man, is "primarily a matter of sharing ends, i. e., a mutual foresight of common consequences." This leads in practice to no doctrine of social or economic equality, but it does imply economic sufficiency for all, and a participation by all workers in the creative side of industry in a way which will satisfy the universal need, in Veblen's phrase, of the "instinct of workmanship."

The author is optimistic for the future of cooperative enterprise and activity, holding that "there is good scientific reason for believing that the limits of cooperation have not yet been glimpsed." The volume is important as a document dealing with the concept of equality in Ameri-

can history, and as expressing clearly a naturalistic interpretation and defense of it. It is not so manifest that naturalism is the triumphant metaphysical view, however, and from this standpoint the author's criticism may be regarded as unconvincing.

HEGEL SELECTIONS, edited by J. Lowenberg. Charles Scribner's Sons, N. Y. 1929. Pp. ix-xliii; 468. $1.00.

The Modern Student's Library has served the double purpose of making available in cheap editions representative writings of the classical philosophers, and of inspiring a number of very interesting introductory essays concerning these men and their thought. The present volume, presenting selections from Hegel, is no exception. Perhaps the most interesting feature, however, is the introductory essay by the editor, Professor J. Loewenberg of the University of California, a brilliant piece of expository writing. Here Hegel is presented as essentially dramatic in method, and comic and romantic in outlook. One quotation must suffice:

> Hegel's strength lies in his clear perception of the actual . . . Hegel's philosophical comedy is 'great and true' in revealing, as does literary comedy, what transpires in our actual world. The violent opposition of ideas and the wanton antagonism of wills are venerable themes; the variations of them discerned by all comic writers have but the appearance of novelty. For this reason genuine comedy neither preaches nor does it scold; it emanates from a realistic conception that human follies are patterns of behavior not of today or of yesterday. What inspires and directs all great comedy is the shrewd observation of a repetitive rhythm in human delusions and contradictions. Of this Hegel's dialectic is a singular expression. With all its abstruseness and obfuscation it is an ingenious instrument of comic art. When all the technical trappings are laid aside Hegel emerges as a comic genius of the first water. He is the laughing philosopher, but his laughter is sober, his laughter is sad.

His thought exposes itself to innumerable keys, but his system remains labyrinthine. The secret of Hegel, the editor concludes, "is still a secret."

OUTLINES OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION, by Horatio W. Dresser. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, N. Y. 1929. Pp. v-viii; 451. $3.00.

The writings of Mr. Horatio Dresser may always be depended upon to exhibit sanity, healthy humanism, and tempered idealism. This latest volume from the versatile pen of the author is no exception to the rule. He has approached the subject of the psychology of religion with the sympathy and insight of one who has known intimately the meaning of the divine. His treatment is neither rapidly psychological nor even pathological. He avoids the exotic, the abnormal, the bizarre; his inter-

est and treatment are always positive and practical. In his own words:

> This volume is an attempt to make explicit the psychology of these more affirmative approaches to the subject, even when this means the inclusion of beliefs in the real existence of a spiritual world, a topic usually neglected by writers on the psychology of religion.

The chapters include among others Worship, Prayer, Faith, Belief, Belief in God, Childhood and adolescence, Dualty of self, Conversion, The sphere of experience, Mysticism, Personality, The subconscious, Symbols, Revelation, Belief in immortality, The spiritual world, Sin and transformation, Intuition and valuation, Rationalism, Changing conceptions, and Religion as a way of life. The author tries to avoid dogmatism, although he confesses that he is

> strongly inclined to favor the modes of worship and beliefs of the Religious Society of Friends and to agree with the adherents of what is now known as the Religion of the Spirit, in contrast with all religions of authority. From such a viewpoint, one is justified in defining religion with reference to the proposition that in man the spirit is fundamental, that man's basic nature is spiritual. The natural conclusion is that religion is a way of life: if its psychology implies a philosophy, it also implies an art.

The author's acquaintance with the field of philosophy has been used to advantage in this review of the religious life as involving psychology.

W. H. L.

BOOKS RECEIVED

GOD IN THE MODERN WORLD, A SYMPOSIUM. E. P. Dutton and Co., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 57. $2.00.

DEVOTIONAL PASSAGES FROM THE HINDU BIBLE, by Dhan Gopal Mukerji. E. P. Dutton and Co., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 57. $2.00.

SIBYLS AND SEERS, by Edwyn Bevan. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1929. Pp. 189. $2.50.

CATECHISME POUR ADULTES, by Louis Coulange. Les Editions Rieder, Paris. 1929. Pp. 237.

THE USE OF PHILOSOPHY, by John H. Muirhead. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1929. Pp. 208. $2.50.

THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM, by Elie Halevy, translated by Mary Morris. The Macmillan Co., San Francisco. 1928. Pp. 554. $8.50.

BERKELEY, ESSAY, PRINCIPLES, DIALOGUES, edited by Mary Whiton Calkins. Chas. Scribners Sons, San Francisco. 1929. Pp. 480.

HOW WE INHERIT, by Edgar Altenburg. Henry Holt and Company, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 273.

TONGUES OF FIRE, by Grace H. Turnbull. The Macmillan Co., San Francisco. 1929. Pp. 416. $3.50.

CHINA: YESTERDAY AND TODAY, by Professor E. T. Williams. Thos. Y. Crowell Co., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 743. $3.75.

SOCIETY AND ITS PROBLEMS, by Grove Samuel Dow. Thomas Y. Crowell, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 707. $3.00.

OUTLINES OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION, by Horatio W. Dresser. Thomas Y. Crowell, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 451. $3.00.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOPENHAUER, edited by Professor Irwin Edman. The Modern Library, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 376. 95c.

THE RELIGION OF LOVE, by H. I. H. Alexander. The Century Co., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 310. $2.00.

THE THEORIES OF INSTINCT, by E. C. Wilm. Yale University Press, New Haven. 1925. Pp. 188. $2.50.

THE GREEK QUESTIONS OF PLUTARCH WITH A NEW TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY, by W. R. Halliday. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1928. Pp. 233. 15s. net.

THE AIMS OF EDUCATION AND OTHER ESSAYS, by Alfred North Whitehead. The Macmillan Co., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 247. $2.50.

THE SUMERIANS, by C. Leonard Wooley. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1928. Pp. 198.

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE, by Francis John McConnell. The Abingdon Press, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 291. $3.00.

JOHN WESLEY AMONG THE SCIENTISTS, by Frank W. Collier. The Abingdon Press, N. Y. 1928. Pp. 351. $2.00.

THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND POLITIC, by Ferdinand Tonnies. The Macmillan Co., N. Y. 1928. Pp. 195.

THE POWER THAT WINS, by Ralph Waldo Trine. The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis. 1929. Pp. 183. $1.75.

THE PASTURES OF WONDER. THE REALM OF MATHEMATICS AND THE REALM OF SCIENCE, by Cassius J. Keyser. Columbia University Press, N. Y. 1929. Pp. 208. $2.75.

SCIENCE AND PERSONALITY, by William Brown. Yale University Press, New Haven. 1929. Pp. 258. $3.00.

THE SOUL COMES BACK, by Joseph H. Coffin. The Macmillan Co., San Francisco. 1929. Pp. 207. $2.00.

THE VEDANTA ACCORDING TO SAMKARA AND RAMANUJA, by S. Radhakrishnan. Allen & Unwin Lt'd., London. 1928. Pp. 287. 10s.

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE, by Major W. G. Hingston. The Macmillan Co., San Francisco. 1929. Pp. 296.

HEGEL'S LOGIC OF WORLD AND IDEA, by Henry S. Macran. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 215. $4.50.

THE MEANING OF ROUSSEAU, by Ernest Hunter Wright. Oxford University Press, Am. Br., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 168. $3.00.

MAN AND HIS BECOMING, according to the Vedanta, translated from Rene Guenon's, by C. J. Whitby. Rider and Company, London, 1928. Pp. 267. 10s. 6d.

THE MAJOR TRADITIONS OF EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY, by George Boas. Harper and Bros., N. Y. 1929. Pp. 497. $3.00.

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Our Contributors' Page

A topic chosen as unusually timely at the 1928 session of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association was the question of the relation of determinism to theoretical physics. A symposium of two papers dealing with this problem, by representative physicists at that session, appear in this issue of the PERSONALIST. The first, *Determinism and Indeterminism in Classical Physics,* is by **V. F. Lenzen,** assistant professor of physics in the University of California. The author, whose special field comprises the principles of physics and statistical mechanics has written extensively. **W. H. Williams,** professor of physics in the University of California, contributes the second and complementary article on *Determinism and Indeterminism in Quantum Physics.* The special field of the writer, who served as Colonel of Field Artillery in the late war, is theoretical physics.

The friendly, lyric voice of **John Richard Moreland** is again heard in *The Mystic Veil.* He has of late received much pleasing recognition.

It has been widely claimed that recent developments in mathematics have entirely destroyed the force of the famous paradoxes of Zeno, and clear the way for a purely rationalistic and impersonalistic account of space, time and motion. **Dr. Henry Lanz,** professor of Slavic Languages in Stanford University, discusses this matter in the article *The Disintegration of Integrals.* This paper also was read at the 1928 meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association at Palo Alto.

The recent appearance in print of a newly discovered group of the poems of *Emily Dickinson* lends timeliness to the study of this unique American character by **Helen Cary Chadwick.** The author, who writes with rare insight and sympathy concerning that extraordinary gossamer soul of American letters, is already known to readers of the PERSONALIST as a poet and essayist.

The relation between Neo-Platonism and the doctrine of the Friends is indicated in a study of that little-known seventeenth century thinker, *Isaac Penington—The Quaker Philosopher,* by **M. Whitcomb Hess.** The author has published articles on the philosophy of music. Her home is in Athens, Ohio.

A wistful bit of song, *Shelter,* is contributed by **Sally Bruce Kinsolving.** Mrs. Kinsolving, whose home is in Baltimore, is the author of several volumes of verse.

Has this age a need to recover the nineteenth century distinction between fancy and imagination? **Reverend Fred Smith** brings to our attention an easily lost but fundamental distinction in the field of art in his article, *Aniline Dyes—Sunset Colors.* He is pastor of the First Congregational Church of Newton, Kansas.

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To the Gentle Personalist

¶ To the many who await each number of the *Personalist* with the anticipated pleasure of enjoying the Editor's usual and always timely lead articles, this issue will prove something of a disappointment. Due to the persistence of ill health, Professor Flewelling has been unable to serve not only in this capacity, but also in its editorial supervision. Good news reaches us from Santa Barbara, where he is in retreat, however, that he is rapidly returning to strength, and it is hoped that he will be with us again in time to give his many friends a January greeting. Personal letters sent to this office will be forwarded to him at his northern address.

¶ An illustrious British philosopher has recently called attention to "the parochialism that mistakes the village pump for the Pierian Spring." Parochialism will remain until the end of evils the great curse of human life. Without it international hatred could not be generated, and war would be impossible from lack of man-power. It is the source of shoddy philosophies of life, whether preached in the back alley or in the pages of clever tomes. To it is due that blatant naturalism which sees no farther than the content of test tubes and mathematical symbols. That the discovery of those profound truths by which nations thrive, and men grow strong and eager with hope involves a fine art of its own, inspired and guided by Insight, is a venerable doctrine not to be forgotten.

¶ To contribute to the despatching of parochialism is the essential purpose for which the *Personalist* was founded. Your criticisms and suggestions toward the improving of its policy and production, within the limits imposed upon it by its as yet restricted endowment, are cordially invited. W. H. L.